

## CIA's plan for Afghanistan

# What went wrong?

Christina Lamb, Lionel Barber

Ten years ago, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Ten months ago they completed their withdrawal. Throughout the occupation and post-occupation period, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been heavily involved in Afghanistan. Now, as before, the CIA is making crucial errors. Afghanistan is not working out as it was supposed to.

The first strategic goal of Soviet withdrawal was completed in February. The second has proved more elusive: the mujahideen resistance, the CIA's anti-Soviet, anti-Communist client, has been unable to dislodge the regime in Kabul and has failed to capture a town since last year.

The present strategy for the biggest overt operation since the Vietnam war draws on its Washington and implemented by the Pakistan military intelligence (ISI), rests on two foundations: the formation of an interim government from the seven Afghan resistance movements based in Peshawar, and the use of military force to thrust this government into power in Kabul.

The Afghan interim government has to date proved to be an unrepresentative and ineffective political vehicle. U.S. officials such as Mr. Peter Tomsen, the U.S. envoy to the resistance, recognise that more needs to be done to broaden the AIG's support inside Afghanistan. "Legitimacy is a problem," he says, "and we're working on it."

One idea is to hold elections in the refugee camps, though this has been rejected by two parties as "un-Islamic"; another, favoured by Pakistan's Foreign Office and many refugees but rejected by three of the seven parties, is to try to entice Afghanistan's former king, 73-year-old Zahir Shah, into an alliance with the AIG.

But this has been at best a half-hearted diplomatic initiative.

"There can be no king-centred alternative," says Mr. Tomsen, "because that only helps the Soviets and splits the resistance."

The resistance's most serious weakness remains its inability to deliver on the battlefield. President Najibullah, whose imminent downfall was widely predicted at the time of the Soviet withdrawal, still controls 26 out of 31 provincial capitals.

A guerrilla force to capture a well-defended town from a disciplined army with air cover is perhaps asking too much. But U.S. officials are at a loss to explain why the mujahideen have been unable to cut off strategic highways or airports to prevent the regime receiving crucial military and food supplies from Moscow.

The CIA, which has one of its largest stations at Islamabad, made several serious miscalculations. Their entire post-withdrawal strategy was predicated on mass defections from the Afghan army which have failed to occur in significant numbers.

The failed attack in March on

the eastern city of Jalalabad, Afghanistan's second city, underlined the inaccuracy of U.S. intelligence. After the fiasco surrounding the mujahideen's attempts to form the AIG, a military victory was desperately needed. But as commanders around Jalalabad had admitted a few weeks earlier, negotiations with tribal chiefs and army units in the area had almost broken down. In other words, the agencies should have known before the attack that the defections which were essential for success would not happen in the numbers needed.

The main commanders refused to attack. But, as Mr. Tomsen admits, "We do have certain levers", and a willing commander was found from the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), the least well-equipped of the seven guerrilla groups. The attack, with its initial capture of three outposts and a garrison, brought other mujahideen flooding into the area. Hamid Gailani, an NIFA leader, later admitted the high command knew nothing of the attack until after it had started.

After leaked intelligence reports said Jalalabad would fall within two days, the attack failed. Thousands had died and 70,000 more refugees arrived in Pakistan's already hard pressed camps.

Yet the CIA had been so confident of a quick mujahideen success that in the crucial months after the Soviet withdrawal the flow of arms had been slowed down. As Jalalabad became a long drawn out affair, ammunition ran short and eventually the rebels withdrew. U.S. officials claimed the arms delay was due to a hold up in the Egyptian part of the pipeline but the distribution chief was later sacked.

The CIA began looking for a scapegoat and blamed General Hamid Gul, the head of ISI, who was transferred. By blaming General Gul personally, U.S. officials hoped to preserve the reputation of what they say is the most important intelligence agency in the Third World.

The problem was that Pakistan's ISI had its own agenda in Afghanistan. The late President Zia-ul-Haq had wanted to place a fundamentalist government in Kabul, preferably led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an extremist separatist. After Zia's death, this mission was carried on by General Gul who, like other top ISI officials, was a pan-Islamist, handpicked by Zia. Many Western diplomats were concerned that the ISI was fitting intelligence to these policy objectives rather than vice versa. Yet, knowing this, the CIA based its information mostly on ISI intelligence and allowed it a big role in formulating policy.

Doubts about the reliance placed by the CIA on ISI caused divisions within the U.S. embassy, where the ambassador, Mr.

Robert Oakley, was one of the architects of the U.S. policy which is going so badly wrong. Some dissenting staff were removed.

The concerns were voiced by Mr. Ed McWilliams, a career diplomat and former deputy chief of mission in Kabul, who until the summer was U.S.-Afghan envoy in Islamabad. A fluent Farsi speaker, he sent several dissenting cables warning that a swift resistance victory was an unrealistic goal, that the ISI's role was questionable and that the AIG was unrepresentative. Mr. McWilliams was ostracised from within the embassy and eventually removed.

Although the ouster of General Gul has not, as first expected, led to a change in policy, the CIA has since tried to play a more active on-the-ground role. But British Foreign Office officials say change has been only cosmetic.

General Gul's removal was also expected to mean that the Pakistan Foreign Office would take over the dominant role from the military in Pakistan, thus paving the way for a political solution in Afghanistan. This was reappraised when Ms. Benazir Bhutto visited the U.S. in June. The U.S. portrayed her as a supporter of military aid to the resistance and declared efforts towards a negotiated settlement premature.

The Pakistan Foreign Office now seems to have given up the search for solutions in the face of opposition from the U.S., an ally Ms. Bhutto feels she cannot do without.

Mr. Robert Peck, now retired, the diplomat who helped negotiate the 1987 Geneva Accords which led to the Soviet withdrawal, is sceptical. "Ms. Bhutto believes that as long as she is a good soldier in Afghanistan, we will keep her in power. Is Benazir Bhutto necessarily in our interests?"

He says the military stalemate means it is time to redefine U.S. interests in the region: "We have a completely different situation on the ground but instead we have been on automatic pilot."

For the moment, the non-policy remains, questioned by few outside newspaper columns or diplomatic circles. Almost all those involved in Afghan policy at a senior U.S. level are, like Mr. Oakley, old Vietnam war hands who remember the humiliation suffered at the hands of the communists then.

Nevertheless, there is a mounting feeling that the U.S. may have to shift its policy stance soon. That, however, poses a delicate question for President George Bush and Mr. James Baker, U.S. secretary of state: how to sell a new policy to Congress, where a core of influential Democratic and Republican law-makers are still committed to total military victory for the resistance?

Many mujahideen, sick of fighting, are saving their only way to force both sides to the negotiating table is for both superpowers to stop supplying arms.

The Soviets are still thought willing to drop President Najibullah, as they were at the time of the Geneva Accords, when the policy-makers in Washington made a series of blunders which let this possibility slip through their fin-

gers. The Soviets now require a credible face-saving alternative.

U.S. officials say military pressure must be kept up if they are to secure a satisfactory political solution. But military pressure is not working. Asim Naseer Zia, a resistance spokesman, asks: "Isn't it time the U.S. realised we don't want to fight to the last Afghan?"

-Courtesy The Financial Times

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A newspaper story in Lahore, Pakistan, reported that hundreds of women in the city of Jalalabad, Afghanistan, were recently captured, raped and enslaved by some Mujahideen groups, following military victories in the city. These events were confirmed by "moderate" Mujahideen commanders and Pakistani officials.

## National NOW Times

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# Wake-up call

First of all, let's stick to principle. Let's insist on the right kind of settlement: genuine self-determination. Unfortunately, matters instead are drifting toward a settlement which, behind the banner of "national reconciliation," will force the resistance to share power with the communists who are responsible for the utter desolation of Afghanistan.

Secretary of State James Baker can put a stop to that drift in his upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by underscoring President Bush's

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commitment to real self-determination.

France's decision to reopen its embassy in Kabul, over the protests of Washington, helps solidify the regime the Soviets set up during their long occupation. If other nations follow France, the Bush administration's principled commitment to self-determination will be sorely tested. Fortunately, the White House now is reassessing matters to determine why aid to the Afghan resistance has not yielded progress toward a just settlement. Such a review is badly needed and should reveal serious flaws to the present plan.

Just a year ago, the situation was encouraging. Moscow, having suffered 13,000 killed, was completing withdrawal of its 120,000 troops. The Soviets' client regime in Kabul soon was driven from the countryside into the cities and was expected to collapse within months. It didn't happen. Why?

The Bush administration took positive steps in its first months. The president directed that aid be con-

turned to the resistance. Mr. Baker closed the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and named a highly competent diplomat as special envoy to the Afghan resistance. But from then on, perhaps because attention was riveted on Europe, Afghanistan was left to plodding, third-level bureaucrats at the CIA and the State Department, who made major errors and ignored serious problems.

While the Soviets mounted a massive airlift, delivering more than 1,000 tons of military supplies to Kabul each day, the United States substantially cut back aid to the Afghan resistance. Long-promised supplies never arrived, and in the major battle of the summer the resistance was driven back from the city of Jalalabad. But it wasn't only shortages, the withdrawal of the regime troops from outposts and their concentration in the cities changed the nature of the war. Where the resistance had employed guerrilla tactics to drive the Soviets and the Kabul regime from the countryside, those tactics now failed when used against concentrated forces supported by massed artillery and sophisticated airpower. To make matters worse, Pakistan played favorites in delivering supplies to the resistance command, sowing discord among the resistance and weakening morale. Fundamentalists got more than their fair share and others, like Ahmad Shah Massoud, a highly effective commander who controls a vital highway between the Soviet border and Kabul, were cut off completely. As a result, no unified military strategy was developed. All these problems were evi-

dent early on but went uncorrected; instead, Washington adopted a policy of watching and waiting, hoping for the best. Unless changes are made, there is no reason to expect better results this year. As an essential first step, the president would be well-advised to require a formal assessment of the Kabul regime's military vulnerabilities. They are many. The loyalty of some of its troops is questionable. There have been reports of coup attempts. Twenty-seven officers who recently defected from the Kabul regime held a press conference in Islamabad, Pakistan, on Jan. 6 and reported that 250 fellow officers had been arrested during December. They also reported growing friction between the army and the militia that could lead to armed clashes at any time. Furthermore, the regime's manpower is stretched thin. Let's devise strategies to exploit these and other vulnerabilities. Bring in the intelligence and planning expertise of the Defense Department to augment that of the CIA. Adjust the mix to fit the new tactics, and above all see that new training is provided.

The political element is as important as the military. We must insist the Afghan Interim Government formed by the resistance last February broaden its base. A year after its creation, the AIG badly needs to make good on its promise to submit to a vote of confidence and to bring into its councils a broad cross section of Afghan civil and military leadership. We and our allies have the leverage to make this understanding with Pakistan about equitable distribution of supplies to the resistance. For too long Washington has acted simply as a compliant freight-forwarder.

As we recall, let us recall the nature of the Najibullah regime. Hand-picked by Moscow like his predecessors, Najibullah cooperated with the Soviets in genocide against his own people. Well more than a million died in the 10 years of oc-

cupation. A third of the nation was driven into foreign exile. The country was desolated with schools and hospitals deliberately destroyed, along with farms, orchards and irrigation systems. Najibullah has a revealing background. For six years, before the Soviets installed him as president, Najibullah was the head of Khad, the secret police overseen and trained by the KGB. Khad's human-rights violations have been widely documented by respected organizations such as Helsinki Watch, Freedom House and Amnesty International. There are even reports Najibullah personally supervised acts of torture while he headed the agency. The Kabul regime would fall in days were it not propped up by \$250 million a month in supplies from the Soviet Union, the vast bulk of it military equipment.

Our goal is worthy and selfless. We seek neither an ally in Kabul nor a government hostile to the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in his remarkable speech to the United States last October, acknowledged the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was illegitimate. The regime installed in Kabul is the illegitimate progeny of that invasion. Let us abjure diplomatic fiction that accords it respectability and gives it a share of power.

Mr. Gorbachev is intensely engaged in dealing with a multitude of crises at home and on the periphery of the Soviet Union. He doesn't need the political and financial burden of Najibullah and his clique. Furthermore, self-determination for Afghanistan is consistent with the new thinking the Soviets have embraced vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. Thus, the potential for reaching an agreement letting Afghans themselves choose their leadership and form of government is greater than might seem on first glance. But until such an agreement is reached, the military pressure must be increased and to do that the administration must remedy the problems which have flawed the execution of its policy. Let us insist upon genuine self-determination and reconfigure our political and military efforts to secure that end. It can be done.

## HUMPHREY

Washington Times

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# Ten years of Afghan war

THE Soviets walked into Afghanistan ten years ago and walked out of it in March 1989, but the war still goes on. The superpowers decided to go on the supporting arms to the warring sides through "positive symmetry"; the war became a proxy war on both sides. The war of resistance against the Soviet soldiers and Kabul troops was successful insofar as it brought Moscow to the point where it realised it couldn't win and had to pull out. The mujahideen were hailed as the warriors of Islam who successfully challenged the atheist

forces of the USSR and PDPA. Pakistan, who had supported the mujahideen through offer of safe haven and had looked after the over-3-million Afghan refugees on its soil, shared some of the bay leaves that adorned the brow of the "conquerors". The ISI generals, who helped the mujahideen plan their offensives against the Soviet-PDPA forces, derived a vicarious satisfaction from this "victory" and psychologically offered the humiliation of being defeated with over 90,000 POWs in East Pakistan. The surrender of 1971 was erased by the "victory" against the Soviets in 1988. General Zia even toyed with the idea of conquering Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia. The voyeurism of Pakistan was extreme.

After the withdrawal, even the Soviet generals waged that the Najibullah regime would crumble within weeks. In the event, that didn't happen. At Jalalabad, the mujahideen proved that they were not such good warriors after all; their limitations as fighters observed by scholars in their books at the very outset, were ignored by the ISI. The generals in Islamabad were deprived of the feeling of having wiped the past defeats clean. The West began to see the war differently. The warriors started looking rag-tag and too fundamentalist for comfort. Suddenly, the strongman Najibullah was transformed into a nationalist who held out the promise of a democratic, non-fanatic Afghanistan; he was no longer the rapist who had to be satisfied by twenty mistresses. Reports against the mujahideen began to be published regularly, climbing with the charge that they were now doing heroin on the side. To make matters worse, the soldiers of Islam started a bloody internecine struggle. The great Sunni interim government fell apart as the polarity between two strong parties in the grand alliance became intense.

The new PPP government in Islamabad owned up the policy on Afghanistan shaped by General Zia with the assistance of the U.S. It didn't recognise the Afghan interim government which couldn't budge from Peshawar and had failed to accommodate representatives of the mujahideen stationed in Iran. Washington decided to give the warriors another chance to dislodge Najibullah while everyone at the U.N. pledged himself to a solution of the conflict through the establishment in Kabul of a broad-based government.

The mujahideen like the prospect of indefinite fighting because that keeps them from making the painful decision about a government in Kabul. Islamabad wants the fighting to stop so that it could send back the massive Afghan population gradually usurping the resources meant for the Pakistani population. It would like to put pressure on the mujahideen to move towards a resolution favouring such an eventuality. But it cannot do so for three very cogent reasons. First, it doesn't yet have a decision from Washington, which funds the war, about the strategy to use vis-a-vis the mujahideen. It seems that Washington wants them to try at least once more to conquer Kabul. Second, the Punjab, ruled by IJI, doesn't only want Islamabad to recognise the Afghan interim government but, together with the Jama'at, accuses the government of having changed the policy of assisting the mujahideen to win the war against the PDPA regime. Any attempt to change policy will have to contend with serious destabilisation by IJI with the help of an indoctrinated population. Third, Saudi Arabia, which has funded the Afghan war together with the U.S., agrees with the IJI stand that the Afghan resistance should continue to enjoy support even if it is exclusively Sunni in nature and is alienated from the mujahideen stationed in Iran. Pakistan can be dangerously destabilised through an Iran-Arab proxy contest.

The crux of the problem is the refugees. Two provinces in Pakistan are under pressure from the exiled Afghan population. Politics in NWFP and Balochistan have become polarised over the Afghan war. As long as the money keeps flowing in with the refugees, and the frontier with Afghanistan is lightly guarded to let in refugees, those who resent the refugees will lie low; but a curtailment of incomes made on the Afghan war will bring them back into the ascendant. The money that comes in through the U.N. cannot last beyond the superpower interest in the conflict; already changes in the core are attracting more and more attention to an era that marks the end of regional conflicts. Money is going to be needed to build a world free of cold war, to invest in economies that promise to adopt free-market principles. And there is Africa to look after following the civil wars and famines. For the U.N. officials, there are careers to be made in Africa; no more, Cordovez's will come shut-

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refugees have not been receiving Islamabad should pants. The real trouble of the Afghan war is about to begin.

Already, the \$400 million dollars promised by the U.S. for the

# Kabul orders economic crackdown

The Muslim 12/28

KABUL, Dec. 27: Afghanistan has announced sweeping measures to shore up its crumbling foreign reserves and exports after hard currency prices rocketed on the money bazaar which virtually determines the country's economy.

The economic crackdown came amid reports of intense buying by the government and the private sector from the bazaar where the dollar now costs 525 Afghani — more than double last December's market rate of 225.

The U.S. unit today costs 125 Afghani more than a month ago while the British pound has moved up 80 Afghani to 521 in the same period.

The government banks continue to use the 55 Afghani to the dollar rate, which dates back 30 years, while buying or selling dollars to diplomatic missions in Kabul.

The government's economic measures seek to stem the trend that is threatening to inject unprecedented inflation into the war-torn country, although bank officials here said they were unlikely to be effective.

"People are massing dollars from the bazaar," an export promotion bank official said, and diplomats confirmed reports of hectic activity in the bazaar.

"The bazaar has gone quite mad and if it continues the Afghani currency would be nothing but shreds of printed paper," a Finance Ministry official said.

But he denied reports of clandestine large-scale buying of dollars from the free bazaar by ministries and state-run corporations, adding that the Kabul administration purchases between four and five million dollars from the market a year.

"The wheel of our economy has not stopped, though a number of economic institutions are not operating and our defence expenses take away part of development funds," Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshmand said in an interview.

He blamed the current financial position, including the fall of the Afghani, on economic sabotage perpetrated by the Mujahideen resistance and their allies.

"prices have gone up and the fixed income groups are suffering most," he said.

The Cabinet on Wednesday banned government firms from buying dollars from the bazaar and advised them to purchase foreign currency from banks in an attempt to check the spiralling prices in the bazaar, a government spokesman said.

The sweeping measures also included provisions for the purchase of dollar earnings of domestic exporters at the prevailing market price and not at the bank rate, currently 126 Afghani less than the bazaar, the spokesman said.

He said the measure would encourage exports, build foreign reserves and improve the balance of trade but did not disclose Kabul's current foreign reserves, widely believed to have significantly shrunk since last year.

Mr. Keshmand said Kabul was attempting to revive defunct economic institutions and raise new ones.

Private traders have also been invited to sell exportable items to the government at the bazaar dollar rates and the finance and trade ministries have been ordered to encourage ex-

ports through measures including partial stripping of customs duties and the government's commission's on export goods.

"These new rules will never work," a senior official of Afghanistan Bank, the country's central bank, said. The seven nationalised banks would be unable to pay exporters at bazaar rates for dollars or the goods that the government has promised to buy to encourage exports.

"Moreover there are very few exporters. Every ministry, every corporation and government firm is only importing through us," the banker said, adding that this was causing the foreign trade deficit to widen.

In 1988 Afghanistan imported goods valued at 694.4 million dollars while exports were worth only 394.7 million dollars.

In the first six months of 1989 imports reached 373 million dollars against exports of 104.9 million dollars, indicating a widening gap, an official said.

The desperation of the government of President Najibullah to build its reserves through exports follows the shrinking of aid in consumer goods from the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist bloc.

Last year Kabul received consumer aid worth 251.7 million dollars from its European allies but aid in the first half of this year totalled only 69.8 million dollars.—AFP

هر چه بکارید همان می‌دری

Whatever you sow you reap.

## North facing famine threat

The Mujahideen commanders in the North and West of Afghanistan have reported food shortages in their areas and have appealed for international support.

In a letter to his representative in Peshawar, Commander Aryanpoor has said that the people of Badakhshan are facing shortages of food and the prices of food commodities have reached beyond the buying ability of the common man.

Aryanpoor said that due to the lack of seasonal rainfall and harsh coldness, the harvest of irrigated and "Lalm" farms (farms located in hilly areas which are naturally irrigated) has been very poor. He added that the late snow fall of last year destroyed the fruit harvest in the area which compounded the severe food shortage. This has led to major increases in food prices. Aryanpoor said the situation has caused worry among the people making them concerned about their future.

He has asked the international relief organizations to help the needy people in his area.

In a similar letter, Commander Ismael Khan, has reported food shortages and high prices of essential commodities in Herat. Ismael Khan expressed concern about the exploitation of the situation by the Communist regime of Kabul. The Kabul regime has intensified the sending of arms, money and food to buy the support of the people in Herat and weaken the resistance.

He has reported that the regime has recently given 80 artillery pieces, 100 armored cars, 300 14.6 mm machine guns and more than 10,000 light weapons to the militias in the province, in addition to great amounts of food and large sums of money.

Ismael Khan also complained about shortages of warm clothes and has reported fresh displacement of people from Pushtoon Zarghoon district. The displaced people are in need of immediate assistance. AFGHANews 1/15

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guerrillas. It is feared, the report said, "that once hostilities end, refugees will turn to poppy cultivation during the period of economic disruption as they seek to rebuild a livelihood interrupted by 10 years of war."

Asbury Park Press n.d.

# Executions split rebel factions battling Afghan government

The Associated Press

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — A rivalry broke open yesterday between the two most powerful Afghan rebel groups after one party convicted and hanged four members of the other for a massacre of guerrilla commanders.

The schism places another obstacle in the insurgents' struggle to topple the Soviet-backed Kabul government and replace it with an Islamic administration.

The guerrillas also said yesterday that three weeks of savage fighting with Afghan government forces have destroyed much of the Afghan garrison town of Khost.

Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, leader of the fundamentalist Hezb-i-Islami guerrilla group, demanded that Burhanuddin Rabbani of the more moderate Jamiat-i-Islami stand trial for the hangings Dec. 21.

"They took a dastardly action. We didn't imagine Jamiat would resort to such a heinous act," Hekmatyar told a news conference in Islamabad.

He called for the appointment of an independent tribunal to put Jamiat leaders on trial for the hangings, which he said were the product of a "mock trial."

Hekmatyar said he was ordering his own men to stay calm.

"I want to call on all Hezb-i-Islami commanders not to knuckle under to their emotions," Hekmatyar said.

However, he warned Jamiat guerrillas not to cross Hezb territory in Afghanistan until the dispute is settled.

A Jamiat spokesman said its northern commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud, ordered the execution of Syed Jamal and three other men of the Hezb party in Taloan, capital of northern Takhar province.

"According to the report, Jamal confessed his crimes against the mujahedeen and the people," said the spokesman, who identified himself only as Omar. The guerrillas are known as mujahedeen, or Islamic holy warriors.

Hekmatyar has acknowledged that Jamal and some other Hezb men captured about 30 Jamiat commanders

and murdered some on July 9 in the same province. He says nine were killed, but Jamiat claims it was all 30.

Masoud later captured Jamal and dozens of other Hezb members.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that hundreds may have died in subsequent clashes between the two groups in various parts of northern Afghanistan.

Both parties are based in Pakistan, which funnels U.S.-supplied arms to them and five other guerrilla factions.

They have been fighting for 11 years to topple Kabul's ruling Marxists, who themselves are split into two rival factions. Soviet troops intervened between December 1979 and February 1989, but Moscow continues to arm Afghanistan's military.

Despite predictions of their early defeat after the Soviet pullout, the Afghan Communists still hold the country's major cities. The guerrillas control about 90 percent of the countryside.

The clashes in northeastern Afghanistan are mainly a turf war in the homeland of the Tajik tribe, which dominates Jamiat.

AIG rallies condemn Soviet invasion

# Hekmatyar assails superpowers

From RAHIMULLAH YUSUFZAI

PESHAWAR, Dec. 27: The Peshawar-based Afghan Mujahideen groups observed the tenth anniversary of the Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan Wednesday by holding rallies to condemn Moscow's action and reiterate their demand for removal of Dr Najibullah's regime in Kabul.

The Aftan Interim Government (AIG) organised five public meetings at different refugee camps today. Its President Prof. Sebghatullah Mujaddedi spoke at a meeting held in Nasir Bagh camp on the outskirts of Peshawar.

The AIG Prime Minister Prof. Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf addressed a rally in the Jallozai camp near Pabbi. AIG Minister for Reconstruction Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani was the star speaker at a meeting in a Haripur camp while Interior Minister Maulvi Yunis Khalis spoke to refugees in a camp in Bajaur Agency.

Defence Minister Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi addressed a rally in the Barakai refugee camp in Swabi District. Justice Minister Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, who heads the pro-Zahir Shah National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, was the lone AIG party leader not to address a meeting since he is abroad.

Hezb-i-Islami Chief Gulbaddin Hekmatyar spoke at a public meeting in Hayatabad near Peshawar. His party, which has suspended its membership in the AIG, independently organised the meeting by bringing a large number of Afghans from various refugee camps.

Prof. Mujaddedi also presided a function hosted by the Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA) at Peshawar's lone five-star hotel. Among others, it was addressed by the WUFA Director Prof. Abdur Rasul Amin, a commander engineer Latif, a former prisoner at the Kabul's Pul-i-Charkhi prison Abdul Bashir Khan, and a disabled Mujahid, Syed Musa. The function was attended by prominent Afghan elders, members of the intelligentsia, and refugees belonging to different resistance groups.

The Additional Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, NWFP Saeed Akhtar was seated beside Prof. Mujaddedi on the stage. U.S. Consul in Peshawar also at-

tended the function.

Prof. Mujaddedi in his speeches both at Npsir Bagh and the WUFA function alleged that 2,000 Soviet military advisers and another 20,000 Soviet disguised as the "Joziani militia" were still stationed in Afghanistan to prop up the crumbling Kabul regime.

He said Soviet warplanes still flew from bases inside USSR to bomb Mujahideen positions and Moscow was providing the most lethal weapons to the puppet regime to keep it in power. He claimed Dr Najib's PDPA regime would collapse as soon as Moscow stopped interfering in the Afghan affairs.

Urging Afghans to support the AIG since it was the only alternative presently available, Prof. Mujaddedi said Mujahideen had started their "Jehad" with meagre resources and would fight until complete victory since they had faith in Almighty Allah and belief in their mission. He argued that the monumental ongoing changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were a fallout of the Afghan Jihad.

The USSR flag was burnt at Nasir Bagh amidst high-pitched slogans against Moscow and Najib and in support of Jihad and AIG. Information Minister Dr Najibullah Lafraie read out the nine-point resolution which said only Afghans were capable of deciding their future, urged recognition of AIG called upon Islamic states to pressure Moscow to end its patronage of Kabul regime, demanded war reparations from the Soviet Union, vowed to continue the Jihad until the establishment of an Islamic Government in Kabul, announced general amnesty for those supporting the PDPA, rejected inclusion of communists in a coalition Afghan Government, appealed for assistance for reconstruction in Afghanistan, and exhorted Mujahideen to step up their Jihad.

Prof. Sayyaf in his address at Pabbi rejected the United Nations proposals and claimed these were aimed at preventing establishment of an Islamic order in Afghanistan. He condemned the propaganda against Mujahideen and maintained that the Resistance was not divided over the question of elections.

The Hezb-i-Islami rally in Hayatabad was bigger than Prof. Mujaddedi's in the nearby Nasir

Bagh camp. Hekmatyar adopted a stridently anti-US posture in his speech and condemned American interference in the Afghan affairs.

He warned that Afghans had showed the Russians that Afghanistan was not Czechoslovakia and they could also prove to the Americans that Afghanistan was not Panama either.



The Hezb-i-Islami had brought a number of disabled and maimed Afghans and orphaned children to the rally to highlight the sufferings inflicted by the Soviets on the Afghan nation. Slogans against both Washington and Moscow were raised and the Najib regime was condemned.

Hekmatyar alleged that the Americans aimed at installing a puppet regime in Kabul once Dr Najib is toppled. He, however, cautioned that Afghans had never allowed foreigners to rule them. He advised Moscow to stop aiding the Kabul regime if it really cared for world peace and the Afghan people.

## Afghan women's rally

RAWALPINDI, Dec. 27: The Afghan women in Pakistan brought out a peaceful procession Wednesday morning on the eve of Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan a decade ago, to protest against the killing of thousands of Afghans by the Soviet troops.

The Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. The women and children were carrying placards against the Najib government. They squatted at the busy Bank Road and blocked the traffic for some time.

The procession, arranged by the Jamiat Inqilabi Zanana Afghanistanist demanded the holding of elections of the Afghan Interim Government immediately.

They appealed to the government of Pakistan to help bring to books the murders of Afghans and Afghan women leader Meena Shaheed, who was martyred while fighting the enemies. —APP

The Muslim 12/28

As many as 16 resolutions were also passed in the meeting. These pledged to continue the Jihad until victory, emergence of an elected Islamic Government, unity in Mujahideen ranks, avoiding attacks on cities to prevent bloodshed, efforts to topple the PDPA, regime with cooperation of Afghan armed forces, demonstrations by citizens in Kabul and elsewhere and raising of Allah-Akbar slogans to show the hatred for the regime, general amnesty for regime supporters, stoppage of arms deliveries to the Najib regime, an end to foreign interference in Afghanistan, the futility of propping up the crumbling Kabul regime by Moscow, warning to enemies of Islam to stop interfering in Afghan affairs.

preventing foreign intelligence agencies from infiltrating Mujahideen ranks, security against assassination attempts.

Mujahideen leaders' warning welfare bodies to stop espionage activities, appreciation to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other countries for supporting Mujahideen and urging Iran to cease hosting refugees on its soil.

The Muslim 12/27

پیش کشا غر  
پایین خواندن.

Reading Scripture in front of a donkey.

# Top generals held

KABUL: A group of generals, including the country's air defence chief, were arrested here last month for plotting a coup against President Najibullah, government sources here said yesterday.

The plot, which resulted in 127 arrests including those of 11 generals, could further widen rifts within the ranks of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), said the sources.

The air defence chief and the commanding general of a vital rocket base in Kabul's Karra district, whose names the sources withheld, were among the arrested, all members of the PDPA's pro-military Khalq faction, they said.

The Khalq and Mr Najibullah's moderate, city-based Parcham group are the two main components of the ruling party.

The sources said the arrests triggered "discontent" among Khalq members, a minority in the 191-member PDPA central committee.

They contradicted official government reports that the plotters were affiliated with the Peshawar-based Hezb-i-Islami Mujahideen faction led by fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

"It is completely an indigenous group without any leaning to the opposition," meaning the Moslem resistance to the Moscow-backed Kabul government, one source said.

Diplomats based in Kabul confirmed this, saying that it appeared the coup plot originated in Kabul.

"Why should Defence Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai support the arrested generals if the officers had not been Khalqs only," one source said.

Mr Tanai had earlier reportedly refused to turn over the arrested officers to the Khad secret police for questioning.

"The foreign ministry's stand is that the coup was plotted by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group and it is baseless (to say) that it was an internal plot," a government spokesman said.

He added that investigations were still continuing and that some of the arrested men had confessed to links with the Mujahideen resistance.

"The arrests of Khalq commanders, all of them military officers, would also give Moscow the right to question Najibullah's hold on his division-ridden party," another source said.

On Sunday, the president warned party executives against "forming groups, factions and splits" in the PDPA, which celebrated its 25th anniversary on Monday.

Mr Najibullah suggested organizational changes in the party to keep pace with changes in East Europe.

On Saturday, deputy Security Minister Yaar Mohammad said a clandestine group called the Central Organisation of the Islamic Party had infiltrated the PDPA, educational institutions, the private sector and army ranks to try to overthrow the government.

Mr Mohammad said the arrests were greeted with jubilation within the PDPA, adding that the plot was the work of the Hezb-i-Islami and the COIP, formed a year ago to conduct the coup.

But one diplomat said he doubted this was true, commenting: "It is not possible for the government to be unaware of a nationwide plot for one full year."

HK Standard

1/3/90

# Widened rift between Khalq, Parcham factions reported

Prof. Mohammad Qasem Jamdar reveals that differences between Khalq and Parcham factions of PDPA has intensified after the arrest of 127 high ranking officers belonging to Khalq faction. This occurred after an alleged coup against Najibullah.

Prof. Jamdar and three other officers who belong to the Khalq faction have recently defected to the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) Mujahideen group.

Prof. Jamdar was the director of Research in the Ministry of Higher Education of the regime and has a doctorate from the Moscow Energy Institute. He said following the arrest of Khalqi officers, tension between General Tani, the Defense Minister of regime, and Dr. Najibullah increased to such an extent that the Soviet Union sent a high-ranking delegation to Kabul to mediate between the two.

This meeting was held in the Soviet embassy in Kabul. General Tani asked for the immediate release of Khalqi officers which was accepted. Other demands of General Tani included the appointment of military officers through the Ministry of Defense, bringing all the militia forces under the command of the ministry of defense and equal share in appointment of military and civilian officers for Khalq and Parcham factions. These demands were not accepted.

Prof. Qasem said that some of those arrested were high-ranking officers. Dr. Najib appointed new men in their place.

Malik said the Soviet advisors work under Major Kolia and are lodged in the Soviet embassy in Kabul. The Soviet advisors wear Afghan uniforms and travel in cars with Afghan licence plates.

Captain Malik is a graduate of Police Academy in Leningrad, disclosed that the Soviets have given 13 SCUD launchers to the regime. Five of these are in Mazar-i-Sharif and eight in Kabul. Four launchers in Kabul are used by KHAD and four others by the Defense Ministry of the regime.

The Kabul regime earlier had reported the discovery of a plot against it. It accused Hezb (Hikmatyar) for the plot. When Professor Jamdar was asked about Hezb's involvement in the alleged coup, he said there was no evidence linking the Hezb to the coup.

Prof. Qasem stated that 5 to 7,000 "Jawzjani militias" have been assigned to defend Kabul. This force was created by Najib and operates under the command of KHAD. He confirmed reports of kidnapping and looting by these militias. He said they had kidnapped 13 women from Qalacha area and looted Koochi Market and Saray-i-Shahzada in the heart of the city.

Abdul Malik Jamdar, son of Prof. Jamdar was an officer of the SCUD missiles launch sites, told the reporters that 20 Soviet advisors are helping to fire SCUD missiles. SCUD is a medium-range missile which carries a warhead of 2000 pounds.

AFGHANews 1/15

# WUFA's Peshawar offices attacked

The Muslim 1/15

PESHAWAR, Jan. 14: Unknown thieves broke into the offices of Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA) in Peshawar on the night of Jan. 12-13 injuring a chowkidar, abducting another one, and decamping with cash, electronic and manual typewriters, photostat and cyclo-styling machines and other office goods.

The WUFA Director Prof. Rasul Amin, who taught in Kabul University before defecting, has registered a case in the University Town Police Station against the unknown thieves. The abducted chowkidar named in the FIR is Ghulam Ishan while

another security guard Faqir Mohammad was wounded.

The thieves came around midnight and took away everything they could find in the WUFA offices located just across the road from the office of Afghan Interim Government (AIG), President Prof. Sebghatullah Mojaddedi in Peshawar's posh University Town. They reportedly stole Rs. 14,500 in cash, an electronic typewriter, three manual typewriters, photocopier, a cyclo-styling machine, and other office material.

Prof. Amin when approached for comments said he did not want to blame anyone. He, however, said that WUFA won't

be able to function for quite sometime now owing to the theft. He thought it was precisely the mission of the attackers.

Prof. Rasul Amin, who is affiliated with the moderate pro-Zahir Shah NIFA, had recently organised a function at one of the five star hotels in Peshawar to condemn the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on its 10th anniversary on Dec. 27, 1989. The function was presided by AIG President Prof. Mojaddedi who is a moderate.

The police suspects that only Afghans who knew WUFA offices and its working could have committed the theft and abducted the chowkidar.



# Mujahideen and refugees condemn Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan

Huge meetings were held throughout out Pakistan and some world cities to remember the tenth anniversary of the Russian invasion into Afghanistan which dates from the 27 December 1979 and lasted until the 15 February, 1989. A common theme in each meeting was universal condemnation of the illegality of the Russian invasion and the terrible sufferings being endured by the Afghan people.

The AIG released a text outlining nine points to mark their policy direction. In summary these points are:

- 1) Russia must pay war reparations.
- 2) Jihad will continue until an Islamic government is installed.
- 3) Greater international pressure must be brought onto Russia to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
- 4) All governments should recognize the AIG.
- 5) The People of Afghanistan are

solely responsible for determining their own future

6) Present members of the communist regime will not be represented in any future Islamic government.

7) A general amnesty is passed onto all innocent officers and officials of the Kabul regime if they give themselves up to the AIG.

8) International donations are urgently required.

9) Military actions by the Mujahideen need to be increased. . . .

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, paid rich tribute to the people of Afghanistan in a specially prepared statement to mark the anniversary. She stressed that Pakistan took "great pride in saluting the Afghan people for setting an example of Islamic valor and faith that will abide and inspire freedom loving people all over the world."

In Afghanistan the anniversary was celebrated by the Mujahideen attacking different military targets in various parts of the country.

AFGHANews 1/15

## Moscow is inclined to replace Najib: US

WASHINGTON — A hardline congressional supporter of the Afghan guerrillas says he has returned from talks in Moscow more sympathetic to a negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan.

Charles Wilson, a Republican member of the House intelligence committee, said he met with Valentin Falin, chief of the international department of the Soviet Communist Party, and Nikolai Kozrev, the chief Soviet envoy for Afghan affairs.

"The Russians had met there to talk about ways to negotiate an end to the war in Afghanistan, presumably on the theory that if they could persuade me, they could persuade anybody," Mr. Wilson said Monday.

"The talks always froze on one point, and that was whether the Mujahideen were going to be compelled to negotiate with Najibullah," he said.

"My position was that Najibullah was covered with blood, that he was the devil, that he was Hitler, that you couldn't ask people who had sacrificed everything, including most of their relatives for the past 10 years, to negotiate with the perpetrators of the crime," he said.

Nevertheless, he said, he came away from the talks with greater sympathy for the Soviet position.

"Their position was that their

world is on the edge of the abyss, that this is a powerful irritant in relations with the United States," he said.

He said the Soviets had said if Washington stopped aiding the guerrillas, Moscow would stop supplying Najibullah government and within a month United Nations could organize and supervise elections.

A State Department official contended, however, that a halt in arms supplies by both sides would leave the guerrillas the weaker because the Soviets had been shipping as much as 300 million dollars a month in weapons to the Najibullah regime. US aid to the rebels is believed to be about 600 million dollars a year.

State Department sources said an end to Soviet aid for Najibullah regime and elections were key demands of United States. They said they were looking for Soviet concessions when Secretary of State James Baker met Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow February 6-7.

"The Soviets at Wyoming and to certain degree at Malta talked about a transitional period. That to US implies moving away from a Najib regime to whatever comes next," a State Department source said.

PT 1/27

## Zahir not ready to share power with Najib

ISLAMABAD — In reply to a statement of the Soviet embassy official here, Zahir Shah said that he has repeatedly rejected the issue of power sharing with the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan and has not accepted it.

Zahir Shah said he had time and again said in the past that he was ready to serve his country and countrymen and would accomplish whatever duty was given to him by the people of Afghanistan.

The daily Washington Post in its Monday's issue had quoted APT as saying that Soviet embassy diplomat Mr. Vladimir Krasimirov has said that Najibullah has expressed readiness to transfer power to a future coalition government headed by former Afghan monarch, Mohammad Zahir Shah. The diplomat has also said that the Soviet and US authorities are also discussing this possibility. He said the settlement of the Afghan war could be found through political negotiations.

The Soviet diplomat said the former Afghan monarch was being respected as a leader by the people and he might come as a head of a future coalition government which can represent every faction of the Afghan society.

The daily Washington Post according to VOA has quoted the Soviet diplomat as having said that the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States would discuss this issue during their forthcoming meeting in Moscow on Feb. 6 and seven.

In a telephonic interview, the spokesman of the former Afghan monarch told VOA that Zahir Shah did not accept power sharing with the Peoples Democratic Party but was ready to serve his country and countrymen without it.

An earlier report from London said: While President Najibullah was exhorting his party and government officials to remain

steadfast and united factionalism and intra-party feuding is causing great concern to Najib.

Najibullah himself owes his position to the manipulation of those rivalries. He has also been very lucky, as he only narrowly survived an April assassination attempt by a dubious army unit and a July coup attempt that was planned and led by his own Defense Minister, Khalq faction chief General Tani.

While the Soviet government has reiterated its support for Najibullah and his party in mid-December, Ambassador Boris Pastukhov's statement that the Soviets had "plainly confirmed" their decision to back the regime has not cleared the fears of Kabul leaders that such support could rapidly disappear.

Najibullah warned his followers in December that "bells of danger" were ringing in the Socialist world, and that "disaster" could befall them if they lose sight of "national and international event". Another top Kabul official, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, was even more pessimistic. He told reporters that "we have become a relic of the cold war," and that while "everywhere else, peace is breaking out, only in Afghanistan must we have war."

In an attempt to win some public support abroad, President Najibullah has repeatedly offered to step down, if that will bring peace. "Give me a guarantee of peace" the President said in an interview. "Then if Najibullah is the problem, I will step aside." However, such pronouncements are "only idle talks," as Najibullah is trying even harder to border his base of support so that he can remain in power. Najibullah told his followers that they should "expand international contacts," and should consider changing the name of the party to "represent its present and future role." — PPI

PT 1/27 —



Frontier Post 1/26

## Team Heads for South Asia — U.N. Steps Up Its Activity

By ROBERT PEAR

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13 — President Bush sent a delegation of senior American officials to South Asia today to accelerate efforts to find a negotiated settlement of the war in Afghanistan.

Nearly a year after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the Administration's policy for trying to establish a nonaligned, non-Communist government in Kabul has not succeeded. The Afghan guerrillas, armed by the United States, seem no closer to a military victory over the Kabul Government than they were in February 1989, when the Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of its troops after a decade of fighting in support of its Communist allies there.

The mission to South Asia, led by Robert M. Kimmitt, the No. 3 official at the State Department, will make the most comprehensive assessment of American policy toward Afghanistan since President Bush took office. . . .

Mr. Kimmitt's mission, while unlikely to produce a reversal of longstanding American policy in Afghanistan, may provide fresh insights and impetus for a diplomatic initiative by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, who is scheduled to visit Moscow early next month.

Mr. Kimmitt will meet in Pakistan with Afghan guerrilla leaders and Pakistani officials. He also plans to visit Saudi Arabia, which helps finance some Afghan guerrilla groups. The delegation will also visit India, where Mr. Kimmitt may meet the new Prime Minister, V. P. Singh, to discuss Afghanistan and other issues.

Margaret D. Tutwiler, the State Department spokeswoman, said the trip did not signal a change or formal review of American policy toward Afghanistan. But clearly American officials are analyzing all possible options in advance of Mr. Baker's trip to Moscow. Afghanistan will be high on the agenda when Mr. Baker meets the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, on Feb. 6 and 7.

Among the policy options are a larger role for the United Nations, simultaneous termination of arms deliveries by both Moscow and Washington, and the creation of a coalition government including Afghan guerrillas and some Communists not closely identified with the current Government. Another option is to ask the exiled King, Mohammed Zahir Shah, to return to Afghanistan and help unify the country.

The delegation led by Mr. Kimmitt, who is Under Secretary for Political Affairs, includes Peter Tomsen, the special American envoy to the Afghan rebels; Michael E. Malinowski, a former consul in Peshawar, Pakistan; A. Peter Burleigh, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; William J. Burns, deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff, and Sandra Charles, a member of the National Security Council staff.

### A Hard-Liner's Softer Views

The United States insists that Najibullah, the Afghan President, resign as part of any political settlement. But the Soviets refuse to abandon him and note that he has shown much more staying power than Washington expected. In February 1989, American officials were predicting that the Najibullah Government would crumble within a few months.

Representative Charles Wilson, a Texas Democrat who is a staunch supporter of the Afghan rebels, visited Moscow this month at the invitation of the Soviet Government, and he came back saying he would no longer insist on military victory for the Afghan guerrillas.

Mr. Wilson once explained that he wanted to help the rebels in Afghanistan because "it's the only place in the world where we are killing Russians." But in an interview this week, he said: "The trip to Moscow softened me. I got a better understanding and appreciation and sympathy for the Soviet position. I saw what a God-awful mess they're in. My No. 1 objective now is a negotiated solution."

"The mujahedeen have got to be more flexible," Mr. Wilson said, using the Arabic word for holy warriors, as the Afghan rebels style themselves. "It's not desirable now for anybody to be hanging from lampposts."

The Congressman said he detected "some flexibility in the Soviet position" and "an extreme desire on their part to get this irritation out of the way."

### Objections to Najibullah

Richard N. Haass, director of Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, said the Afghan guerrillas "will not sit down and talk with or work with Najibullah" because he is "seen as being responsible for too much destruction and devastation." Mr. Najibullah is associated with the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan and "has lost political legitimacy," he said.

"The Soviets have only departed Afghanistan in form, not fact," Mr. Haass asserted. "What enables Najibullah and his associates to hang on is Soviet military and economic assistance, now estimated at \$250 million to \$300 million a month," or \$3 billion to \$3.6 billion a year.

American military aid to the Afghan guerrillas is estimated to have totalled \$600 million last year, but the exact figure is a secret.

The departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan "does not provide much opportunity for cheering," Mr. Haass said. "The fighting and the suffering continue. Afghans continue to die. More than three million Afghans remain refugees in Pakistan."

Mr. Haass said that "Najibullah and his closest associates will have to agree to transfer political power as part of a process leading to a settlement." Beyond that, he said, "we are not wedded to any single political course or political outcome."

سال نیکو از بهارش پیداست

A good year is determined  
by its spring.

## Pérez de Cuéllar seeks a coalition government.

By PAUL LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, Jan. 13 — During two days of talks in Moscow starting on Monday, Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar will seek Soviet backing for a new peace initiative to end the civil war in Afghanistan, diplomats and United Nations officials say.

Almost a year after the Soviet Union completed its military withdrawal from Afghanistan last Feb. 15, the Secretary General is seeking a Soviet endorsement of his efforts to unify the country's fractured anti-Communist opposition. The goal is to form a coalition government of national reconciliation with the Moscow-backed Kabul Government of President Najibullah.

### Broader Opposition Sought

The Secretary General is to meet the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, on Monday and the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, on Tuesday.

In the meetings, the officials said, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar will explore the possibility that the Soviet Union and the United States might agree to halt military aid to, respectively, the Najibullah Government and the Islamic guerrillas, with the Soviets also withdrawing advanced weapons that gave Kabul's forces the edge in recent fighting.

Over the last few months, the United Nations has been quietly exploring the idea of forming a new, broader opposition grouping in Afghanistan that would supersede the Afghanistan interim government announced last February by the seven-party guerrilla alliance based in the Pakistan border town of Peshawar. . . .

As a result, the Secretary General wants the major foreign powers with an interest in Afghanistan to appeal to the rebels to join a broad new opposition group and negotiate a political settlement.

This opposition group would also include the independent rebel field commanders fighting inside Afghanistan, as well as representatives of Afghans living abroad, including Afghan Shiite Muslims who have fled to Iran and supporters of the exiled King, Mohammed Zahir Shah, who lives in Rome.

The opposition parties might create a council of between 80 and 100 representatives, which would empower a smaller team of about 10 to negotiate a political settlement with Kabul or, alternatively, summon a traditional council of Afghan tribes to select a coalition government. . . .

But the Bush Administration is unenthusiastic about the Secretary General's new peace plan. United Nations officials acknowledge, although it has never explicitly rejected it.

The United States apparently still hopes that the interim rebel government can be built up into a credible alternative with the overthrow of the Najibullah Government when the new spring fighting season starts, or at least strengthen its bargaining position by capturing important towns, as it conspicuously failed to do last year.

JANUARY 14, 1990

THE NEW YORK TIMES

NYT 1/14

# A Question of Survival

*Its security and survival hinging on a delicate system of protocol and secret agreements, the ancient city of Herat is attempting a recovery amidst the rubble of war ...*

**H**erat, once the crossroads of Central Asia and now the capital of western Afghanistan, was an ancient city when Alexander the Great passed through it. Described by UNESCO as the oldest living city in the world, it is now the centre-piece of Afghan President Najibullah's strategy to gain a breathing space in his regime's fight with the mujahideen. Truces with dozens of local guerrilla commanders and massive Soviet aid in the shape of free food and weapons has bought a tentative peace as Herat returns to the traditional tribal way of Afghan government.

Razak, 13 years' old, carries a Kalashnikov and stands guard outside the Park Hotel in Herat. He earns 5000 Afghanis a month, 1000 more than a doctor in Kabul. Officially, he belongs to the 21st Regiment of Afghan State Security. In reality, the 250 man rag-tag force, led by commander Ghiasuddin, is one of 20 local militias, most of them led by mujahideen turncoats who maintain security in and around Herat. Commander Ghiasuddin has been given 100,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, one tank, 70 rocket propelled grenades and food supplies for his men — all supplied free by the Soviet Union.

At the top end of the scale is commander Anwar Sayed Ahmed, who has 8 to 10,000 men, 10 tanks, 40 other military vehicles and the run of the city. Recently, Sayed Ahmed fell out with Ismael Khan, the most powerful mujahideen leader in western Afghanistan, and the government snapped him up. The future of Afghanistan is already evident in Herat where local militias have bridged the ideological divide between the Islamic mujahideen and the regime.

"With some of our opposition brothers we have signed open protocols; with others, secret protocols, and some we are negotiating with. We have no agreement with Ismael Khan, but our relations are not bad," said Abdul Khaliq Yar, the governor of Herat province, who is not a member of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

In the vast Persian-style hall of the governor's palace, hundreds of

petitioners sit on the tiled floor and wait for an audience with him. The governor, 60 years old, from an elite Afghan family, is a political survivor from earlier regimes — one of the few rich Afghans who did not flee the country when the PDPA took power in 1979. Now trapped in this backwater, but still dressed in a three-piece suit, he ruefully digresses about the time he spent at the World Bank in Washington.

His political style is that of a tribal chief arbitrating between bickering clans rather than the former PDPA style of centralised communist rule. Tribal councils, or *jirgas*, and personal contact with clan chiefs and landlords make the governor a popular man. It is a style being pushed by President Najibullah — to return Afghanistan to the politics of traditional compromise, by bribing and persuading the mujahideen to the negotiating table.

However, the crackle of AK-47 gunfire and the thud of artillery rounds reverberate continuously through the night as the rival militias demonstrate their machismo, while army artillery keeps the mujahideen, who are just outside Herat, at bay. It is about as peaceful as it is possible in a city where every second man wears bullet belts down to his ankles. The militiamen take their armoured personnel carriers (APCs) down to the bazaar for shopping in the evenings. In an array of different clothes, from the remains of army uniforms to baggy shalwar kameezes, they lounge on top of their APCs in Ramboesque poses sipping fizzy drinks. Every man carries a Kalashnikov, a pistol at his belt and a couple of hand grenades, which they keep flicking as though they were worry beads.

Everywhere the deals between the mujahideen and the regime are evident. There is little military presence around one Herat airport, which the guerrillas have agreed not to attack. However, the 20 kilometre drive to the city is done at breakneck speed under the watchful eyes of tanks, because there is no deal with the guerrillas on the road. From the air, this single ribbon of concrete that cuts through the lush orchards and farms around the city, runs south to Kandahar and north to the Soviet border. But the road is rutted with tank treads and it is like driving along a wavy sea with your head hitting the jeep roof at the top of

every wave.

At Herat airport, the latest MI 35 Soviet helicopter gunships, loaded down with bombs and rockets, prepare to take off to distant mujahideen positions. Afghan mechanics tinker with the engines of the latest high-tech machines in the oldest city in the world. Herat is so old that it is one of the few cities continuously mentioned in old Persian and Arabic manuscripts. Its strategic position in the ancient world, on the crossroads between central Asia, the Indian Subcontinent and westward to Iran, made it a centre for caravans of camels carrying goods half way across the world. The 'serais' or courtyards in the bazaar where caravans would stop for a few days to rest, are still standing, although dilapidated and shot through with rocket fire.

Herat played host to Marco Polo, and survived the onslaughts of Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and Alexander the Great until the Soviet invasion in 1979. Its beautiful fir-tree lined avenues, huge 19th century villas and ancient carpet bazaars are now falling apart. In 1980, Herat, under Ismael Khan, staged an insurrection against the Soviets, which left 600 Russians dead, thousands of civilians killed and 14,000 houses destroyed. The Russians only retook Herat after they flattened the entire western part of the city with carpet bombing, killing thousands of residents. You turn off a main road in the city and are suddenly confronted with a landscape of ruins stretching to the horizon.

The view is about the closest anyone will get of seeing a nuclear holocaust without the bomb actually being dropped. It is a mark of Afghan stubbornness that a few families still live in the ruins, their children clambering over broken brickwork, collapsed roofs and gutted walls to show visitors their patch-work homes. Even in the ruins, the ubiquitous militias have set up their outposts, flying their different coloured flags from a tangle of masonry, determined to hold onto their patch of a devastated city.

By Ahmed Rashid

The Herald, December 1989



# Kabul calls for elected council

ISLAMABAD: Afghan President, General Najibullah, appealed for all sides of the Afghan conflict to join a grand council to try to end more than 10 years of war.

Speaking on Kabul Radio, he said this was the only way to halt the bloodshed between his Soviet-backed government and Muslim rebels.

"Therefore we propose that an extended council be established of representatives of all political forces to be elected inside Afghanistan and abroad in front of United Nations representatives," he said.

Western-supported rebels based in Pakistan have always rejected previous Najibullah peace offers, refusing to share power with his People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

The rebel Afghan interim government based in the Pakistan frontier city, Peshawar, is meeting this week to try to work out an agreement between guerilla leaders on how to choose their own shura (council).

They are under pressure

from their main backers, the United States and Pakistan, to broaden the base of their government to make it more representative.

US Undersecretary of State, Mr Robert Kimmitt, arrived in Islamabad yesterday. He is expected to underline Washington's demand that the leaders of the seven rebel parties in Peshawar bury their differences and perform better.

US sources said he would review Washington's Afghan policy ahead of next month's meeting in Moscow between US Secretary of State, Mr James Baker, and Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Eduard Shevardnadze.

General Najibullah said in his broadcast, on the third anniversary of his national reconciliation policy, he was ready to guarantee the security and political freedom of anybody who took part in his council.

He made no mention of a previous offer to quit if it would help the peace process.

SCMP 1/17

# US to support Islamic govt. in Afghanistan

LAHORE—The US Special Envoy to the Afghan Interim Government, Mr. Peter Tomsen, has said that the peace in Afghanistan could not be restored till the establishment of a representative regime in Kabul.

Answering questions by experts from Riyadh, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi on the Afghan problem at a live worldnet dialogue via satellite, Mr. Peter Tomsen said that the US policy is aimed at political settlement of the Afghan issue which would not be possible unless the Najib government is removed. He said although the US objective of Soviet pullout has been achieved but the right of self-determination of Afghans is yet to be achieved.

Answering a question on the US failure to recognise the AIG, Mr. Tomsen said that the US will not do so till the inception of a representative government in Afghanistan and the Mujahideen's total control on the territory.

He, however, said that the US and Pakistan were fully

supporting AIG in economic, health, education and other sectors. The US would continue supporting the resistance.

"It is time to convince Najib to hand over power to the Afghan people. The US has also impressed upon the Soviet Union to withdraw support to Najib. The Soviet Union was informed that the right to Afghans was being denied as was given by the USSR to Eastern European countries."

Replying to a question he said that it is not due to the US support to Afghan Mujahideen that the conflict was continuing. It was rather due to Soviet Union's support to an unrepresentative government in Kabul.

Replying to a question, he said that although infighting between various Mujahideen groups has harmed the resistance struggle, but the news of internal conflicts were exaggerated. The Mujahideen groups, he said, were cooperating each other. He said the confusion is being created on the achievements of Mujahideen. He said there is a difference in

# AIG will hold elections for grand 'Shoora' soon

The Afghan Interim Government will hold elections throughout Afghanistan for a broad-based Shoora (council)

Pro. Sayyaf the Prime Minister of AIG told reporters in Peshawar on January 27 that the elections will start in February and will be completed within four months.

According to the AIG program the people of each of the 216 districts (Woloswalis) will elect ten people from among themselves as members of a Grand Assembly. At least one of the ten persons should be from the refugee camps. The ten elected people will then choose one person from among themselves as a member of the national assembly. The rest of the elected members will form district and provincial councils.

Each Mujahideen party will also introduce 15 people to the Grand Assembly, five of whom should be independent. Ten of the 15 people will be chosen to the National Assembly. Three of these must be independent.

Election procedure will be decided by the people in each constituency. The

flexibility regarding election procedure is introduced to make the program successful in country which is at war. The qualifications of the candidates will be determined by the Election Commissioner of the AIG.

The AIG believes that the national assembly created throughout such elections will be representative.


Hezb Islami (Hikmatyar) has opposed the AIG plan and has called for holding elections in Afghanistan and the refugee camps using ballot box.

The Iran-based Mujahideen parties have also raised some questions about the elections.

Prof. Sayyaf told BBC that the AIG would discuss the details of the election plan with Hezb and Iran-based parties so that a consensus is reached. But he made it clear that elections will be held according to the program even if the differences are not resolved.

The AIG's tenure, which was to expire in February, has been extended till creation of the new Shoora.

AFGHANews February 1



conventional warfare and guerilla war which led to the controversy.

Mr. Tomsen said Mujahideen have shown progress on the political front. "The AIG must also include Shia groups and dissident commanders."

Replying to a question on the US support to King Zahir Shah, he said although some factions of the people support Zahir Shah but the US supported only the resistance groups instead of a particular person.

Replying to a question that the US may not like an Islamic government in Afghanistan, Mr. Tomsen said that US will welcome whatever form of government is formed by the people. He said Afghanistan had an Islamic character prior to the Soviet invasion. The Afghans have very strong religious thoughts. After the war, there would be an Islamic government in Afghanistan which would be fully supported by the US. He said that the United States has very good relations with

Islamic countries. The US would support elections for the future government but it is upto the Afghans to decide the question of the future of government.

Replying to a question, he said that the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, is fully supporting the Afghan Mujahideen. He said Pakistan's policies were consistent. Pakistan's support was tremendous and the AIG headquarters were in Peshawar.

Replying to a question that the US might sacrifice Afghanistan while normalising terms with Soviet Union in the wake of recent developments in Eastern Europe, Mr. Tomsen said that the American envoy said that although Soviet Union has shown encouraging response in the disarmament of nuclear and traditional weapons and civil liberties in Eastern Europe, but its policies on regional issues have not changed. He said the US will see how regional issues are dealt with by the Soviet Union.

# Ending the Afghan War

## Let's Fix Our Military and Political Mistakes And Start Negotiating a Deal With the Soviets

By Zalmay Khalilzad

**W**HEN THE Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan last February, almost everyone expected the quick overthrow of the Najibullah government by the mujaheddin. Without the Soviets, it was believed, the Kabul government's morale would plummet, the regime would disintegrate and the mujaheddin would sweep victoriously forward.

But a series of mistakes were made, and we can no longer anticipate a quick military victory. Instead, we should step up our efforts for a diplomatic settlement with the Soviets.

In fact, a reasonable settlement at this point would serve the interests of the Afghan people as well as broader Western interests. The Soviets have considerable interests of their own for accepting a settlement: The Kabul regime remains on the defensive; Soviet support for the Kabul government is far more expensive than our support for the mujaheddin; and Afghanistan continues to be a burden—although to a lesser degree than in the past—on U.S.-Soviet relations.

We can increase Soviet incentives to settle by increasing mujaheddin effectiveness; they continue to be vital for gaining Soviet agreement. To do that, however, we must overcome the problems of the past 10 months.

The situation in Afghanistan has been marked by military mistakes and political difficulties. First, the United States failed to resupply the mujaheddin adequately for several months during spring and summer, a time when Soviet resupply of the Najibullah regime was substantial. (Congress recently approved funding for the mujaheddin for the current fiscal year.)

A second and more serious problem has been the absence of a strategy—or even short-term campaign plans—with any reasonable prospects of success. It is not the mujaheddin commanders who decide on military operations and strategy, but Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Directorates (ISI), which channels outside military assistance to them. ISI has gained considerable operational control over the war in Afghanistan, and its preferred modus operandi is to subcontract piecemeal for military operations. After deciding what targets should be hit, ISI hires a major or minor commander to carry it out.

Such subcontracting has had a devastating impact on mujaheddin effectiveness. It is resented by many commanders—especially since the Soviet withdrawal and the resulting rise in Afghan nationalism. The major commanders get even more upset when ISI bypasses them, and their anger is reflected in a reduced motivation to fight or to cooperate with ISI.

Furthermore, the mujaheddin government—the AIG—is divided and ineffective. It has very little to do with the war and is not taken seriously by some mujaheddin commanders. AIG leaders are unwilling to share power—even power that they do not yet have—and have failed to broaden their political standing.

**T**here is a danger that the mujaheddin might split three ways. Without a new military council and a new AIG, rebel leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar might well form his own government. It is also possible that supporters of the former king might set up their own government. Of course, the AIG is likely to stay. Should such a development take place, Afghanistan would be well on its way to becoming another Lebanon—putting at risk an eventual political settlement and threatening Pakistani stability.

The Pakistani government recognizes that the war has not progressed well. Disappointed in the ISI, Prime Minister Bhutto has decided to rely more on Gen. Beg—the strong man of the Pakistani army—to take the lead in developing and implementing Pakistan's Afghan policy. What policy Beg might follow or how effective he will be in controlling ISI is uncertain. Bhutto fears that the United States might lose interest in Afghanistan, and Pakistan might end up holding the bag.

We have an unusual opportunity to shape events. Pakistan is more willing than ever before to cooperate with us in dealing with the Afghanistan conflict. We should use the time between now and the next fighting season in March to put in place a new, integrated strategy, one which develops a framework for a possible settlement. There are several ways for achieving this objective—none of them simple.

One possible framework could be the following two-stage plan: The first stage could consist of the resignation of the Najibullah government and its replacement by a transition administration in Kabul; the simultaneous dissolution of the mujaheddin interim government; the disbanding of KHAD, the hated state security police; and an end to external military assistance to all Afghans. During the second stage, the transitional administration would hold parliamentary elections with U.N. help and supervision. This can take place some six months to a year after the formation of the transition administration. Najibullah's party, the various mujaheddin parties and the supporters of the former king can all participate in the elections; and the resulting parliament would decide on a more permanent government for Afghanistan.

At present, the Soviets insist that Najibullah and the opposition should directly negotiate a coalition government. This approach is unrealistic and risky. Some important Afghan groups will reject this approach, and its adoption by the United States would increase disarray among the mujaheddin. Our own political process is such that we would have to penalize those refusing to negotiate. Given the divisions within the opposition, Najibullah would be in a stronger position at the negotiating table.

Any new military strategy must meet the following criteria: It must have the support of key commanders and produce more cooperation among them, and it should increase the military pressure on the regime and encourage defections. Defections have dropped off due to the disorganized nature of the opposition, its insufficient military success and the treatment earlier defectors had received.

Afghan commanders should be encouraged to establish a mechanism such as a council and come up with an agreed-upon military strategy. We and the Pakistanis can offer suggestions and comments, but the Afghan commanders must take the lead. Recently, the AIG established a joint military operation planning cell. But so far it does not include key commanders.

On the political front, the pressure on Najibullah can only increase if the AIG broadens itself and shares power with the commanders, the supporters of the former king and the Iran-based groups. This can be best achieved through negotiations or the convening of a more representative council than the one which chose the current AIG. The new council would have the power to modify the AIG. The AIG is committed to the convening of another council before the end of May. Whether it is able to carry it out effectively remains to be seen.

THE WASHINGTON POST JANUARY 7, 1990

کوه هر قدر بلند باشد

باز هم سر خود راه دارد

There is path to the top of  
even the highest  
mountains.

### Afghanistan: Holy Man Detained Following Sermon

Maulavi Abdul Rauf Logari, the elderly Imam of Wazir Akbar Khan Mosque in Kabul, has been detained without trial in Pul-e-Charkhi Prison since April 7. Although the precise charges against him have not been made public, he reportedly preached an anti-government sermon when Afghan President Najibullah was attending Friday prayers in the mosque. There is no indication that he had advocated violence during the sermon.

The arrest of suspected political prisoners in Afghanistan is generally carried out without warrant by security or military personnel. Prisoners are often held incommunicado for interrogation under the authority of the Ministry of State Security and may be tortured and ill-treated. Interrogation is usually carried out at one of several detention centers in Kabul or in a special section of Pul-e-Charkhi Prison. Detainees are then tried in Special Revolutionary Courts without access to defense counsel. There is no right of appeal to a higher court.

Pul-e-Charkhi is the main prison in Kabul. The majority of Afghanistan's political prisoners are held there. In September 1988 the government reported that they were holding 2,125 political prisoners.

Please send courteous letters appealing for the release of Maulavi Abdul Rauf Logari to: President Najibullah/Office of the President/Kabul, Afghanistan. Salutation is *Your Excellency*. Air-mail postage: 45c. ■

Zalmay Khalilzad is a senior political scientist at the Rand Corp. The views expressed here are his own.

Amnesty Action Nov/Dec 1989

From the Editor:

At long last, a FORUM magnifying instrument is enclosed with this issue. Keep it handy because, in spite of being off the front pages, Afghanistan still fuels lots of comment & fine print, & much of it is in this issue.

The Afghan proverbs scattered thru-out the issue are from recent issues of AFGHANews. The creation below is freely adapted from Frontier Post cartoons. Why the blue cover last time? Our usual green was discontinued. However it's now back in production in a slightly heavier weight. Feel the difference?

Occasional Paper #29, "Seclusion or Service: Will Women Have a Role in the Future of Afghanistan?," by Nancy Dupree is being (or has been) sent to all who ordered Papers with last year's subscriptions. If you didn't, but want a copy now, send us \$5 & we'll mail one to you.

Our thanks to all of you who sent clippings & information; keep it up. The deadline for the next issue is 4/15.

Nawroz greetings to all.



## EVENTS

To those of you who lived in Afghanistan when it was beautiful & peaceful:

The Scorpion Galactic Reunion will be held August 2-5, 1990, at the Red Lion Inn in Colorado Springs. American Airlines is offering a group discount on reunion air travel. Those attending the reunion will be AISK/KIHS students, faculty & staff, parents, Peace Corps Volunteers, USAID staff, US Ambassadors, Embassy staff & other Afghanistan "Old Hands" plus spouses & children. Further information is available from the AISK/KIHS Reunion Committee, 9516 Garwood St., Silver Spring, MD 20901 (301)587-4661. If you would like to subscribe to THE SCORPION NEWSLETTER, published quarterly & full of gossip, pictures, addresses of long-lost friends, current events & information, send \$10 to the above address. We hope to see you at the reunion!

Molly Alexander, 1971-74

Dave Fliehr, Class of 1974

MUSIC OF AFGHANISTAN with Shah Wali Taranasaz, Abdullah Wahab, Nangealai, & John Baily will be presented at Greenwich House, 27 Barrow St., New York City, on Friday, March 9 at 8 p.m. The concert is sponsored by the WORLD MUSIC INSTITUTE. Admission is \$12.

The ANAHITA GALLERY's annual Afghanistan Show & Sale, to benefit the INT'L MEDICAL CORPS, will be held at the Topanga Community House, 1440 No. Topanga Canyon Blvd, in the Canyon, from 11-5 on March 17-18. For further information write or call the Gallery at P.O. Box 1305, Santa Monica, CA 90406 (213)455-2310.

The INSTITUTE FOR ASIAN STUDIES will sponsor illustrated lectures on "Art of the Nomads: Central Asia" by Karen Robinson on March 19 at 6:30 p.m. & "Observations on Contemporary Afghanistan" by Mary Ann Siegfried on April 26 at 8 p.m. Both programs will be held at St. Peter's Church, 54th St. & Lexington Ave., New York City. The registration fee is \$10 per lecture.

The Annual Meeting of the ASSOCIATION FOR ASIAN STUDIES will take place at the Palmer House in Chicago from April 5-8. Eden Naby will chair a panel on "Central Asian History: The Local Perspective." And there is an Afghan restaurant in Chicago: THE HELMAND

3201 N. HALSTED, (312) 935-2447  
Rated among the top 20 restaurants by Chicago Magazine. Reasonably priced, the Helmand entails a gracious dining room with high tin ceiling, filled with plants and carpeted with hand made Afghan rugs. Professional and white table cloth service. Parking available.

## REPORT FROM TAJIKISTAN

I had been invited by the Tajikistan Academy of Sciences to a commemorative meeting in memory of a distinguished Tajik, Bobojan Gafurov, former head of the Communist Party of Tajikistan and then, from 1956 to his death in 1977, director of Soviet Orientalists in Moscow. He had been a friend with whom I had held many discussions about Central Asian Studies both in my capacity as a Harvard University professor and as director of an institute in Shiraz, Iran where I had served from 1969 to 1975. Both my respect for him as the prime developer of Soviet Oriental Studies and my feeling for his humanity in dealing with others had led me to undertake such a long and arduous trip half way around the world at Christmas time.

The trip had been difficult, for at the outset my baggage had been lost somewhere between Boston-New York and Moscow and I didn't recover it until leaving the Soviet Union. Then because of fog at Domodedovo airport southeast of the city of Moscow, passengers on the plane to Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, had to wait in the airport for 20 hours not knowing when the plane would depart. The delay did give one a chance to talk to fellow passengers and after my observation that Raisa Gorbachev was a lovely example of the perestroika of Soviet women, ice was broken for interesting discussions about the state of the Soviet Union, where I had not been for 12 years.

Even though I was a foreigner, past memories of suspicion and guarded remarks by ordinary Soviet citizens in talking with me were forgotten in the new era of glasnost. While world peace and friendship were still two items in talks with foreigners, it was clear that domestic concerns were top priority now. The fate of the ruble and inflation were at the top of everyone's concerns. Would wages and earnings keep up with the rise in prices and what would the future hold for the Soviet economy? These were the burning questions of the day and

who had any answers? In this respect Soviet citizens were like those everywhere only more anxious and uncertain. I had arrived in Moscow at the time of the funeral of Andrei Sakharov and on every side people spoke with great emotion and respect for the late scientist who had broken silence so openly echoing the sentiments of his people. Most Americans who visited the Soviet Union in the past had felt oppressed and even fearful, but in my circle of Orientalist friends in the past I had only felt cordiality and even affection, not to mention the traditional Russian hospitality. Now others would find similar sentiments in most Soviet citizens. The world certainly was changing but was the American Gov't itself able to change with the people? Several Soviet citizens asked me this and I could only reply that I hoped so; but that the American people were revising their opinions about the Soviet Union in a positive manner, or so I assured my new acquaintances.

In Dushanbe, armored helicopters were still visible at the airport and people asked me if the US really wanted to support a fanatic, fundamentalist gov't in Afghanistan in the future. But no one defended the invasion of Afghanistan; on the contrary they praised certain Tajiks who, like Sakharov, spoke out against the invasion from the outset. At the same time they wanted to help their Afghan brothers and deplored the terrible destruction in that country. Military supplies obviously were still going into Afghanistan and many Tajiks had served there in various advisory and aid capacities. On the whole, however, Tajiks with whom I spoke wished to forget Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and think only of the future.

In a similar manner the Tajiks universally were sorry for the suffering of their western "brothers" in Iran and hoped for closer contacts with both countries in the future. Most definitely a pan-Iranian sentiment is widespread in Tajikistan, especially as the country is surrounded by Turkic-speaking neighbors, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Turkmens. This is surely a factor in the apparent lack of friction between

Tajiks and Russians and other Soviet Europeans, for the Western big brothers are a guarantee that the smaller Tajik nation will not be absorbed by more numerous Uzbeks. At the same time, the common culture of the Uzbeks and Tajiks, really one people speaking two languages, as well as the Islamic religion, suggests that the Tajik enclave in Uzbek territory, at Leninobod, will not become a Gorno-Karabagh between radically different peoples. There are so many bi-lingual speakers, Uzbek and Tajik, in Tajikistan that a basic conflict between the two seems unlikely, at least as concerns the leaders and intellectuals.

The city of Dushanbe had grown greatly since my last visit and the war in Afghanistan was responsible for much of the construction visible on all sides except the north where the Hissar mountain range limits growth. Although reports of shortages of consumer goods flourish in European Russia, here the bazaar seemed well stocked with both goods and food. This is, of course, relative to their own past and not to American standards, but no signs of semi-starvation or even poverty seemed visible.


At the meeting in memory of Gafurov, an Afghan scholar from Kabul and an Afghan diplomat from Moscow, an Indian lady from Aligarh and I were the only foreigners who participated. The high point of the session was an Afghan poet resident in Dushanbe who recited a Dari poem he had composed in a classical panegyric style. As anyone who has lived in Afghanistan, Iran or Tajikistan knows, nothing moves people as much as beautifully recited poetry. One Tajik remarked about the Afghans, "You see, we really are brothers."

I had always told my Afghan, Iranian and Tajik friends that my heart belonged in that part of the world since, even though they had been born there, my life work and devotion to those 3 countries had persisted over half a century. In truth, I felt at home in Tajikistan, with fond memories of its melons, grapes and other delightful foods,

its music, dances, poetry and arts. Furthermore, beauty is especially cultivated there, and was even more so in the past as witnessed by remains of superb wall paintings, silver objects and statues from over a millenium and a half ago, which one finds in museums and archaeological excavations. Past civilizations have left their mark on the people which makes their study most fascinating.

So it was with happiness but regret that I left the warm land of the Tajiks to return to the ice and snow of Moscow and even more freezing New York and Boston. On the plane back to Moscow I mused that just as we need more competition between airlines flying to Moscow, so economic rivalry may be the greatest key to the success of perestroika in the Soviet Union. Central Asians will have little difficulty in returning to a bazaar economy where wits are matched with a flair for production to meet individual needs and thus develop a flourishing economy with repercussions throughout the Soviet Union. My advice to Westerners: keep an eye on the vast area of Central Asia, rich in undeveloped natural resources; do not count it out as a backwater either in China or, especially, in the Soviet Union.

Richard N. Frye  
Aga Khan Professor of  
Iranian & Chairman,  
Committee on Inner Asian  
& Altaic Studies  
Harvard University



The Afghanistan Jihad exhibition was opened by Prof. Sayyaf, the Prime Minister of the Afghan

Interim Government, on January 18 in Peshawar.

The exhibition, which was organized by the Ministry of Information of the interim government, displayed photographs, posters, cartoons, drawings, calligraphy, books, periodicals, journals, handicrafts by those handicapped as a result of the war, historical and cultural relics, captured military equipment and video films from the battlefields of Afghanistan.

The exhibition was open to the public from 19 till 24 January. The last two days were set aside for lady visitors only.

AFGHANews 2/1



# Afghans still deprived of proper education

After the commencing of war and invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces in 1979, the whole educational system of the country has completely been disturbed. More than 80 per cent of Afghan students have been compelled to leave education and either defend or be against the regime.

This is why we can find a lot of teenagers in the Kabul regime's forces. A huge number of students have either been killed during fighting or sent to prison. Higher education has almost completely been closed down, because from the very beginning Afghanistan had only two universities, one in Kabul and the other in Ningrahar. Every year thousands of undergraduate students from all over the country used to come to these universities. But, unfortunately, the Communist coup and civil war in Afghanistan led not only to the devastation of the social, economical and political system of the country but it was also a big disaster and misfortune for systematic education.

After the Saur Revolution, education has been altered to politics—the politics of force and violation. No student and teacher was allowed to be affiliated to another organisation or be impartial and neutral. Every student had to be a propagandist of the regime and play an active role of a spy. This was why more than 80 per cent seasoned teachers and freeminded students left Kabul University campus. A big number of them either took refuge in the neighbouring countries or joined with the mujahideen ranks. Another big number of them have been sent to jail. But universities came under the control of young activists of Khad. No independent student was able to take admission in the university, even to come to Kabul. Every student, first, should be enlisted in military service; even 12-year-old students have been sent to the battlefield. This was not only the case in universities or city schools, but also in all Afghan educational institutions and schools the same kind of dictatorship prevailed. Due to this, universities and schools became places only for the sons of Khad agents, party members and their propagandists.

Standardised education has been sabotaged. Arabic, English and other international languages were replaced by Russian. All Islamic subjects have been removed. Most of the Afghan and Western professors were replaced by Russians. This was why the engineering faculty of Kabul, which was

supervised by Western teachers, has been closed for many years.

This was not only the disastrous end of modern education, but religious education was also badly affected. The regime started to send religious scholars to jail, in order to prevent them from imparting religious awareness to the common people, who had profound respect for them. This was the start of *jihad*. As soon as ulema understood the activities of the regime, they announced *jihad* against it, in order to uproot communist theory from the country. The regime was very serious about religious education, even no one could discuss the subject of *jihad* freely before the people because the regime was afraid of the people's reaction. Most of the religious scholars came to Pakistan and a large number of them also went to the mountainous areas and started to organise people against the regime. In a few months in 1978, almost all religious schools were closed all over the country. This was a big upheaval. Education wound up and war commenced.

Now the University of Ningrahar is closed because of the war. Since last March, when the war was intensified in Jalalabad, a big number of students and teachers left the city and came to Pakistan. The University of Kabul, which once was very famous, now is no university anymore. Only this year, more than sixty teachers and lecturers left the university and came to Pakistan and India. The number of students is also fluctuating. Sometimes the number comes down to 2,000 students and sometimes it hardly reaches 4,000, of which 70 per cent are female students. No student of other cities of Afghanistan comes to Kabul anymore. Kabul University is no more the university of Afghanistan; it is the university of Kabul city alone. The cities which are under the regime's control, also are deprived of education. The whole attention of the regime is paid to war and military situation. The priority has been given to soldiers and military officers. The regime gives only 3,000 afghanis to a school teacher,

while a militiaman or military worker takes from 15,000 to 25,000 monthly. High-ranking military officers are paid a very high salary. On the other hand, the whole system of standardised and independent education has been exploited by the Soviet Union.

Educational methodology is changed to a compulsory propaganda terminology. All attention is paid to the October Revolution. Regular films pertaining to the Soviet Revolution are presented to the students. No Islamic and political books of any other theories

exist in the libraries. All libraries and book stores are full of the books of communist theory, communist revolutions, Russia and the newspapers and periodicals of pro-Moscow organisations. During the ten years of war in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has taken more than 50,000 Afghan children to Moscow and other cities. But, unfortunately, not for education which will one day be necessary for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. They were taken there only for indoctrination and intensive military training, in order to use Soviet arms and play a key role in the destruction of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, before the withdrawal of her forces, brought these Afghans, along with other sophisticated weapons, to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union collected all valuable volumes and documents regarding Afghan culture and important historical events and Islamic values. The Kabul regime, on the other hand, encourages all people, including shopkeepers, to learn Russian and study communist theory's books.

If we come to the mujahideen side, and the territory which is under their control, we will conclude that, on their side, also education has totally been ignored. No one paid attention to this valuable national property. More than 85 per cent of territory is under the mujahideen control, but no commander or any other leader gives priority to proper education. From the very beginning, the literacy percentage was only three, but after the war no one can think about the literacy percentage. One hundred per cent, Afghans are deprived of proper education. All teachers and students of schools and madrasas became mujahideen. They spent ten years in war, they forgot everything that they had learned. Therefore from religious to modern education, now none of them knows even a simple thing. In most of the villages no one can read a single letter.

Some relief organisations in Peshawar and Quetta are trying to support Afghans' education and assist them to establish educational institutions inside Afghanistan. They are giving financial aids and school books to those who are willing to set up schools and madrasas. If Afghans had used these aids in a proper way, that would have given a lot of important benefits to them. Ironically, a number of opportunists used the social property for self-aggrandisement and nepotism. Because of the imbalanced and disunited political situation, some people have registered three or four schools in one village, but in reality none of

them exists. Even some people have been selling school books and don't take them to Afghanistan. Political parties and the interim government have also failed to control the situation and apprehend the people who are betraying the whole nation.

The mujahideen political parties, along with some other foreign organisations, have set up some schools in refugee camps in Pakistan. These schools and madrasas are also faced with a lack of effective teaching methodology and disorganisation. However, this kind of school is useful, provided some improvements be made in the school's organisation. Education on this side has also taken a political shape. When a student fails in one school, immediately he goes to the school of another party. This complicates the situation for the teachers, and makes it difficult to bring an effective and equal system among the students.

Really, the biggest problem of Afghans is in getting higher education. Over years of war the mujahideen leaders didn't think, even for a single moment, that Afghanistan would lose all its educated people during the war if they did not find chances for these young people. It would be a very good step if all the parties made a joint university. The Pakistan Government has only a few seats for Afghan students in a year, while Afghans need more. Islamic and Western countries also did nothing for the Afghans in the education field. Now, for Afghan youth, the only education consists of first aid courses in Pakistan, while these are futile, even harmful, for future Afghanistan. In fact, we need professional and regular education. When the time comes for reconstruction of Afghanistan, Afghans will face a big vacuum in the technical and professional fields. The reconstruction will take a long time with a lot of defections. A serious lack of the co-operation and co-ordination will appear between the educated Afghans, because they studied in different countries and opposite societies. Most of the new generation will not know Afghan culture and even official languages. For a long time political and theoretical differences will persist in all educational institutions.

For the improvement of the present situation, the following points must be kept in mind. The mujahideen organisations, especially their government, must know its accountability and find suitable chances for the higher studies of Afghans. The mujahideen-sympathiser countries, especially USA and Pakistan, must accept more Afghans in their universities for

proper higher education. In fact, this is again the responsibility of AIG. AIG itself must establish a university and invite other countries to assist. All political differences must be expelled from education and all parties must co-operate. Only courses or short period education must not be accepted as complete studies. Chances must be found for every Afghan who wants to study. Nepotism in education must be ended. AIG must send people to all the countries of the world, to seek out such opportunities for its people. Above all, AIG must end its present inactivity.

Frontier Post 11/30

## Price of dithering

THE landing of a deadly Scud missile precariously close to the potential inferno of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), and not very far from the nation's capital, should serve as an eye-opener to the crop of disaster being raised by Pakistan's current dithering on the question of Afghan freedom struggle. As good Muslims, we can all be grateful that a catastrophe much worse than the Ohri Camp holocaust has been averted, which would most certainly have come about if the projectile had hit its likely target of the country's largest ammunition-production complex of the POF. Or, was the squib dampened intentionally, and was meant to convey the capability of the Kabul regime to inflict untold devastation at the time and place of its own choosing?

At any rate, Wednesday's attack has clearly demonstrated the counter-productivity of, at best, a half-hearted embroilment in a most volatile and unsettled situation just across the national border. It has also proved beyond a measure of doubt—if such a proof was ever needed—that there can be no half-way solutions with regard to as committed and intensive a resistance movement as has raged inside Afghanistan for more than a decade now. The point to be considered here is as to what encouraged the Kabul regime to mount such a daringly blatant aggression of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty at a time when this country's interest in the success of the Resistance has been reduced to not much more than a pretence.

There is nothing ironic involved here. Kabul has been encouraged to resort to the unprecedented affront precisely because of our knees having gone weak in the decisive phase of the Mujahideen's freedom struggle. Irrespective of who took the bold initiative of applying Pakistan's response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, and irrespective also of whatever supposed political mileage may have then been seen by the regime at Islamabad in formulating this Afghan policy, Pakistan's approach was determined by sound geo-strategic interests. These interests have only gained further validity due to certain other consequent developments in the extended region around Pakistan.

The new political government of Pakistan must extricate itself from its sapping obsession with each and every thing connected with the previous era if the logical achievements of the country's decade-long sacrifices in the cause of ensuring a permanently friendly Afghanistan are not to be completely frittered away. Worse, as the latest Scud incident has shown, all those sacrifices may in the event backfire on us with unpredictable consequences. Whatever the compulsive or the inspired detractors of Pakistan's Afghan policy may say, this country has paid a very high price indeed to secure its own long-term strategic interests. No global or regional power can look kindly to the furtherance of these interests and the new international correlations, especially in this region. It is about time Pakistan found back its own two feet on this as also on other questions of paramount national interest.

# TBS show documents Afghanistan as seen through eyes of Soviet GIs

By IAY SHARBUETT  
The Associated Press

"I'm a documentary producer," says Jeff Harmon. "What I do is document history."

During the war in Afghanistan, he did it the hard way — with one program about the rebels, then another about the Soviet troops.

Vietnam vets in particular might find some of its scenes eerily familiar. There's no triple canopy jungle, to be

sure. But there are the contour-flying helicopters, the door gunners watching the ground, the dusty hill outposts resupplied by chopper and the convoy-guarding armored personnel carrier rolling along, its young driver listening to Western rock on his boombox.

Another deja vu moment, in a Kabul hospital: The wounded Soviet grunt who, according to the show's English translation, complains that in this war, "you can't understand who are the civilians and who are the enemies."

The two programs — the first is "Afghanistan's Holy War" — were filmed three years apart and shown on TBS' National Geographic Explorer series.

Harmon, 36, was born in Los Angeles. Based in London, but "living out of my suitcase now," he says he's "basically self-educated," with a year logged at New York University's film school.

He did his first Afghanistan war documentary out of plain curiosity: "The image of these 19th-century tribesmen battling a superpower intrigued the hell out of me. And I got sucked into the image and went."

Bankrolled by the BBC, Harmon and cameraman Alexander Lindsay emulated other correspondents trying to cover the rebels after Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan in 1979. The two slipped across the border from Pakistan in 1985.

His aim, he says, was to show the war from the grunt-level perspective of the Soviet-fighting rebels, the mujahideen, "the muj" (pronounced "mooj"), as

some Westerners call them.

"I don't go in with a correspondent or make myself a correspondent," he says. "I tell the story of the people I'm covering. I do it through their eyes. ... I don't whitewash anything. I don't take a partisan view."


Indeed, he says, some rebel political leaders got upset at his documentary about the rebel troops, including what the troops thought of their leaders and "their real way of life," including that some smoked hashish.

The leaders considered all that bad for the rebel image, Harmon says. His opinion of them isn't kind: "They were like World War I generals. To them, their men ... out on the front lines, were cannon fodder."

He told the *Soviets*: "I'm not going to make a propaganda film for you. But I'm not going to do a hatchet job on you, either. All I want to do is show the war through the eyes of the ordinary Ivan."

Asbury Park Press 2/7

تا ناهد چوبه  
فرمان نبرد گار و خو.  
Without a green switch the  
ox and the donkey won't  
obey.



**T**he two greatest excitements on earth may well be adultery and war. Arts and letters, classical and contemporary, are persuasive on the point, if not dispositive. Whichever it is, let us take a powder on the first of these ancient agitations and cite for a moment the role of the second in the recent career of Sandy Gall. Britain's best-known television journalist. At the beginning of the first of his three books on Afghanistan — the third, a novel, is the occasion for today's meeting — he tells of hearing the call of the anti-Soviet jihad. It was 1982, and he was 55 years old: "Life had lost its savour and I felt I needed a challenge. I had been flying a desk too long." Gall thought the war had been under-reported in the West by major news-gathering organisations for grubby cost-benefit reasons.

Someone ought to take the Afghans and their unfolding disaster seriously — a prominent journalist, say, if one could be found. As if in reply to his own help-wanted ad, he and a camera crew made a two-month trek from the border with Pakistan, through Nuristan and up into the Hindu Kush for London's ITV. They went looking for Ahmad Shah Massoud, a sort of young Tito of the resistance and the paramount commander of the mujihadeen in the heavily fought over Panjsher Valley, 50-odd miles northeast of Kabul. They found their man. The resulting documentary validated the Afghan cause for the many Britons who tuned in. You can read all about it in *Behind Russian Lines: An Afghan Journal* (St. Martin's Press, London), a far more satisfactory business than the Gall novel to hand.

Gall, who had done hard duty as a reporter in the Middle East, Vietnam and Africa (Idi Amin locked him up in a Ugandan jail), walked every step of the way to and from Massoud's base camp, over 14,000-foot passes and around the broad apron of a Soviet offensive. With the exception of *The New York Times's* Arthur Bonner, Gall is, from all that I know, the oldest *kafir* journalist to tramp around Afghanistan on anything like a meaningful trip in the years since the December 1979 invasion.

*Behind Russian Lines* was good on what seemed, seven years ago, a doomed and quixotic struggle. A reader like me, who was preparing for an Afghan walk-about of his own and turned to the book as to a primer, stood to learn a good deal about the guerillas' ecstatic bond with holy war, a pre-modern society's complete visceral aversion to the writ of a rogue superpower, the desolation that Soviet might and main had visited upon the Afghan countryside. Gall conveyed the Lean-Attenborough appeal of Afghanistan, a terrain of stupefying, wide-screen alpine beauty, of summer sunrises and sunsets that, from high mountain passes, invite the soul to adventure. He described well the blue-chip fears of travel with the mujihadeen, the hung seconds of pure dread — the makings of what serious critics used to call *The Life of Extreme Moment*, or some such high-blown phrase. Gall's affection for the openhearted Afghans seemed real enough, and not the product of cross-cultural slumming. (S.J. Perelman drove a 1949 MG from Paris to Peking in the fall of 1978. From Pakistan he wrote to a friend, "Thus far the high point of the trip, in every sense, was

# The Afghan scam

LAWRENCE WALSH

Afghanistan — the people are the nicest, most colorful, and filthiest.") Gall was one of the first witnesses of the jihad who bothered to differentiate between the Afghans' God-soaked fatalism and the fanaticism of warriors elsewhere in the Islamic world. These were not suicidal people. In my experience the mujihadeen could be relied upon to make tracks whenever the "Sovs" (in Persian, the *Shuravi*) heaved into view in unpleasant numbers. Paradise was the certain reward of martyrdom, true enough, but the attitude I was delighted to find prevalent was, Look here, foreign friend, what's the rush? Gall was, finally, dead on the mark about the everyday exactions of a trip with the mujihadeen, from the constant need to claw one's way through the various insane avowals of innumerable guides to the truth of a fast-shifting situation (all Afghan assertions having to do with distance or time, or enemy strength and losses, are ridiculous on their face) to the challenge of jihad cuisine — the food on offer in teahouses and encampments was stuff you might be able to get down, but wouldn't want to step in. (Gall supplied much vivid, highly personal gastroenterological data along with — one might better say as a result of — the menus.)

Gall has tirelessly promoted Massoud ever since their first encounter in the Panjshir. Tirelessly, but not dishonorably: Massoud deserves the attention. He is most un-Afghan in his penchant for planning, order, discipline, structure and predictability. These qualities stand out powerfully against the endless muddle and deviousness of other jihad luminaries celebrated by the *farangs*. One thinks foremost of Abdul Haq, the ludicrously anointed "Lion of Kabul", a substantial and attractive figure

more or less in the Massoud mold back in the early days of the resistance, but for years now a no-show commander corrupted by the fanzine prose of flatterers from Western publications and television. Massoud has never once quit the field, much less learned to speak in sound bites or turn up in London and Washington for banquets and the backslapping of professional rus-

sophobes. If Gall's Afghanistan reporting has been *parti pris*, he has *pris'd* the right *parti*.

It is time I entered upon my duty-in-chief, which is as an evaluator of Gall's first novel, *Salang*. As a reviewer, I pretty much stand with the late Robert Lekachman: "I most enjoy a thoroughly bad book, full of detestable sentiments phrased in execrable prose by a perpetrator of poor character, say, the latest volume of Richard Nixon's memoirs." Alas: we have here nothing more than a small and silly novel by a man who has answered the siren call of fiction and run afoul of the

Peter Principle. A perfectly good print and broadcast journalist, Gall has committed a novel, *art*, thus rising to the level of his incompetence. I suppose you would call *Salang* a thriller, and I suppose I should say something about it, dumb book or no. It ought to be a clue to my estimation of *Salang* that after two good-faith marches through it I remember little of "the plot of this gripping novel (set against) the upheaval of the final Russian withdrawal" of February 1989, to boost some of the dustjacket copy. Mike, a cashiered SAS officer — and therefore expendable — is paired by some MI6 gents with a Red Army defector-of-conscience, Anatoly. They are rehearsed in England and Pakistan for a sabotage caper inside Afghanistan, to blow up the Salang Tunnel "on the vital supply line between Russia and her troops," thereby encouraging the Soviets to stick to their stand-down timetable. A most improbable feat of arms, the tunnel job, but it's brought off. That the mission makes not the slightest military or political sense, even in the outlandish terms of thrillerdom — well, let it

slide: it must be that Gall spent his advance, and was overtaken by events at mid-novel, to wit, M i k h a i l Gorbachev's brutally common-sensical decision to cut losses and meet the Geneva Accord's February 15 deadline and just get out.

In a dreamy coda to the tunnel operation,

Mike the *ingleez* gets to tag along with valorous commander Durran — Durran equals Massoud; Gall cannot wean himself from the great Panjsheri, in life or in fiction — on an almost-Final Push on Kabul. In street fighting, he kills Durran's arch-rival in the resistance, known in the

novel only as the Butcher, but for whom you should confidently read Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in real life the CIA's most-favoured Afghan terrorist, a busy assassin of resistance rivals, a religious maniac of the first water (Al Capone at prayer would be more like it), the foreign minister of the absurd Afghan Interim Government in exile, and sometime visitor to the Oval Office, where a few years ago he swapped ideas on truth and beauty with the notional chief executive, R. Reagan.

When it comes to women, *Salang* is a nice, frosty schooner of Libido Lite. Oh, Gall has made room for two dusky beauties from the resistance underground, sisters, each full of what I take to be an unmeant sexual charm, but this is boy's-own fare. British males of a certain martial and manly cast are godawful at giving women a break, even in dopey novels, if I may say so. Haw haw haw. (There is also Ken Follett to call to task. Follett's meretricious Afghan hustle, *Lie Down with Lions*, doubtlessly has earned big money for one of the pros of the political-military thriller. *Lie Down*, which also taps Massoud for a cameo role, is spacious enough, to say nothing of specious enough, for some honking in the bushes between MiG sorties and the milk runs of helicopter gunships. And lo, it was good. Follett did not trouble himself to book jihad passage, but instead rented advice from fellow Eng-

lishmen who were frequent visitors to the fighting. One of them, an acquaintance of mine, came away from a London briefing of Follett with a case of Dorn Perignon for his pains.

How I had set my heart on throwing down on *Salang* a Henry James-E.M. Forster what-is-a-novel template, but life is too short. Still, some words on Gall's people — and words. Gall the stylist: His prose is serviceable, and that's it. Any fun, playfulness? I think not. He utters many a splendid commonplace on the heroic mujihadeen, but the book's language is awash. From its 247 pages, I cannot break out a single passage for praise or reproof. A failure of art or nerve? Hard to know. His characters: the air of the novel is heavy with evanescence. We are talking thin, thin to the point of microscopic inconsequence. There are comic-book Russians — brute Russkies, knocking back KGB vodka. The Afghans themselves are twaddle out of bad Kipling, *Salang's* heroes, heavies and maidens are of such psychological poverty that if you were to spend the weekend with the lot of them, all of you eating ice cream buck naked in a nicksaw, you'd remember nothing of the exercise, nothing at all, come Monday morning.

Not a literary event, *Salang*. But there is a bizarre failing that has nothing to do with ill-carpentered scenes, dull-write or character development of extreme marginality. Nowhere in this almost up-to-date novel of Afghanistan in struggle is there so much as a hint of the single great besetting problem of the society that has survived the Soviet period: the spirit of contradiction embedded in the Afghan's tribal psyche. What Afghans do not know of rivalry, suspicion, revenge, and purlindunk of the stranger probably is not worth knowing. Social fractionation among the dominant Pushtuns has long been an amusing cat's cradle for Western anthropologists and other, mostly British idolators of the romantic, "difficult" Afghans. But now, with fantastic supplies of automatic weapons and light artillery spread promiscuously around the country, the jihad — the holy war — has retooled itself into simple gang warfare. Communism, modernism, secularism — whatever it was that took form in Kabul and caused all the trouble 15 years ago — is, with the Soviets now bundled off home, no longer a common, unifying enemy. Simple, insensate otherness, articulated along regional, lingual, confessional, class and ethnic lines, is back in business as the murderous provocation of choice. "We no longer know who or what we are fighting for," a guerrilla commander told Ahmed Rashid of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in September. Discriminating students of Afghan affairs, such few as still pay attention, may soon forget the horrible toll of Soviet attempts at subjugation in the face of a large-scale return to war-lordism and old "agrarian ways", i.e. the raising of heroin poppy.

The Afghans have worn out their welcome in the West. With the Soviet bogey removed, they have served their purpose for a fawning news industry which, hankering after a simple cause, found in the highly photogenic Afghan resistance a story that made few demands on the mental and moral faculties. The intramural ambushes

and assassinations of the past summer have shown the mujihadeen to be, for many observers, little more than the trigger-happy outcasts they always have been, shooting up villages and one another for who knows what reason. Raggeds fall out, right. The Sharks and the Jets mix it up — who cares. An unsympathetic crew. Made out as attractive if irascible hillbillies, nascent Jeffersonian farmer-democrats in funny hats with an affecting habit of prayer, the mujihadeen and their fight are sinking into the ooze of inconclusion and atmospheric violence that gave them life. They are now a grave embarrassment to their scattering Western patrons, the *realpolitik* hearties in the State Department especially, few of whom have ever spent an afternoon at the sharp end of policy, chaps who wanted all along only to humiliate Moscow in the Afghan outback and leave it at that. Exeunt mu.

With November and the return of snow in the mountains, the end of the 1989 "fighting season" is at hand, and with it the complete disintegration of the resistance. The Butcher — Gulbuddin — is riding high.

however. His exceedingly loosely organised, the handiwork of Pakistani generals and intelligence agents, and of course the CIA, could wait out the vagrant humours of Afghan politics, someday slip into Kabul, and overwhelm the government. It could happen. Gulbuddin in

power would make Najibullah, the Kabul regime's top thug, look like Olaf Palme. *Ruthless* does not begin to describe the man and his retinue of prayer-crazed rotters and stranglers. *Psychotic* might. A theocracy run along the lines of Gulbuddin's lunatic programme would

be a stain on Islam — and sow the seed of a long-term policy debate for the United States. For the hapless Afghans, it would be the ultimate legacy of the Reagan Doctrine — a black curse on any future. A self-possessed people, whether wearers of tribalys or turbans, would long ago have packed off Gulbuddin to the middle of fuck-all nowhere as the short-arm inspector in a male brothel. Foreign minister. White House huddler. Head Afghan. *Allah akbar*.

It is remarkable to me that Gall, for all his hard-won experience and undoubted commitment to the Afghans, wrote *Salang* without a thought to the grim post-Soviet power pageant. It is everything that counts in Afghanistan today. Yes, yes, nasty of me to pound on old Gall for bringing to life such a wildness novel, and I should now give it a rest, but his risky border crossing from journalism to literature didn't relieve him of an obligation to get things whole and right. He is. I am reliably informed, a brick, his naive and sentimental love of the Afghan guerrillas he came by honestly, but passion, engagement and heart-tugging are never enough, not for the writing of novels, not even for television reportage. I shouldn't

think. For now, if fictionists wanted from the Soviet-Afghan war, *Sal-*

ang, the work of this Follett person and the efforts of two or three other dim bulbs in the pulp trade will have to do. We cannot expect from the Afghans themselves any home-grown literary art in the long narrative form the world calls a novel. Most of the young bloods who fought the Russians were, and remain, illiterate farmers. Their society lacks a broadly shared written

tradition — an oral tradition is in place, a fine and famously rich one of walking songs and commonfolk poetry, but a hard and pellucid memoir of the war from the pen of an Afghan Everyman? This we will not soon see.

Not to be left out of this cranky inquest are the journalists who, though they may have bravely attended the mujihadeen from the start, were by dint of temperament and intellect incapable of explaining to their editors (or themselves) the tedious and immemorial involutions of Afghanistan that are today playing out every which way in civil war. Those I am thinking of wish Afghanistan had turned out to be a more simple affair. They are only now beginning to grasp what they have witnessed. A bit late.

The war attracted every sort of journalistic except very good ones. Post-journalists of the worldwide Right leached up in the border city of Peshawar with press cards, and fantasies of Masada and Valley Forge. These were somewhat blocked and obsessive personalities, strung-out male misfits stirred to life by the prospect of a letting of Russian — *communists!* — blood, some were courageous, many were merely reckless. For the most part they were the sort of men who hoped devoutly to sell something, anything to *Soldier of Fortune*, the monthly magazine for sociopaths published in Colorado. From Britain came many, many public school boys with Nikons, a hi-ho spirit of upperclass abandon and the understanding that there was good sport to be had in Afghanistan, thumping the Bolsheviks. Ex-SAS geeks showed up, fancying a spot of adventure, a go at freelancing a *chevalier du jihad* before mustering out for life's duty in the City and marriage to Caroline.

Youthful panache, muscular partisanship — these were okay for straight-out gunsmoke coverage in the first years of the jihad, in its David-and-Goliath phase, and even for reporting the dolorous actualities of life for the five million refugees. But the cheerleading, the hagiography, the war-love — in the end, these have poorly served the Afghans. There is an absurd delusion

is a work on a book, to be published by Alfred A. Knopf, about thirty months of travel with guests of the right and of the left in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Lawrence Walsh is an American writer living in Toronto. Between 1985 and the spring of 1987 he made six trips inside Afghanistan with the aid of the right and of the left in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

All Asia Review of Books December 1989

## For Ahmad, it was a question of who was going to pay him the most and leave him alone.

By John Pomfret  
Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan -- With four wives, hashish-smoking bodyguards, a black beard and turban to match, Amir Said Ahmad doesn't look much like a general in Afghanistan's army.

(Clutching a Soviet-made AK-47 automatic rifle, he resembles a Moslem guerrilla warrior. Two years ago, he was one.)

But after fighting the government and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan for eight years, Ahmad switched sides and became a general in the forces he once fought.

Ideology was not the reason, he said. For Ahmad, it was a question of who was going to pay him the most and leave him alone.

"I don't go with anyone forever," he said in an interview in his expansive guest house in Kabul. "I only go with the one who works for my men. When that stops, I switch sides."

In exchange for his pledge of allegiance to Afghan leader Najibullah, Ahmad was made a general in Afghanistan's military, a member of Parliament and given arms, food and hundreds of thousands of dollars a month for him and his 3,000 men. The government also promised that his militia group, which controls parts of Herat province in the west, could continue its business activities there.

A new Mercedes-Benz car and the Kabul guest house were thrown in for good measure.

"I don't know how much money I have, but I have too much," Ahmad said with a smile. A circle of heavily armed men surrounding the bearded general chuckled approvingly. The chocolate-like smell of hashish filled the room.

Ahmad is just one of dozens of former guerrilla commanders who have left the U.S.-backed mujahedeen, as the guerrillas are known, and joined the government since Najibullah announced his "national reconciliation" policy two years ago.

The policy combines elements of a return to the traditional Afghan way of solving problems with the "united front" policy used by Communist parties in trouble.

In the traditional relationship, tribes pledged loyalty to a central government while retaining autonomy in their local affairs. The "united front" has been traditionally used by Communist parties that cannot control a country by themselves. With this strategy, they unite with whomever they can, gain control and then go after their old allies.

The policy is an about-face for the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which came to power in 1978 and attempted to exert central control over the country and institute a communist revolution.

In other areas as well, Najibullah's "national reconciliation" has halted Afghanistan's communist experiment. Government monopolies on fuel and sugar transportation were lifted recently, and the state issued a plea to all private traders to help feed the people during the winter, when food is scarce because of the weather and the war. The government now denies it is communist.

Diplomats in Kabul, mostly from the Soviet bloc or non-aligned countries, said the government's attempt to placate the powerful militias by allowing them to keep their weapons might replace one problem, civil war, with another, lawlessness. Indeed, the Afghan tribes are no longer armed with flintlock rifles; heavy weapons fill their mountain strongholds.

"I have tanks, armored personnel carriers, rockets, mortars and bombs," Ahmad said with a great grin. "If things get difficult, I can get airplanes, fighter jets, you name it."



Amir Said Ahmad shown with 5-year-old son Abdul

"In my territory, I am the boss."

In Herat, Ahmad is called Amir, which means prince or lord. His group owns several villages and the largest cement factory in the province, giving them an effective monopoly on the local construction industry.

They also staff checkpoints on the main provincial road and, along with other militia groups, demand payments of food or money from trucks in exchange for safe passage.

In Kabul, an Afghan doctor said she treats dozens of gunshot wounds a month, many of them inflicted by militias.

"It's like your Wild West," said the American-trained physician, speaking on condition of anonymity. "These men all want to be cowboys."

Ahmad's family has lived in Herat for generations. After the 1978 revolution, the government attempted to break the power of local lords like the Ahmad family and launched a radical policy of land reform.

Many of the lords went to war. Ahmad joined the mujahedeen, which means Islamic holy warriors, in their fight to overthrow the government.

The arrival of the Soviet army in Afghanistan in December 1979 further galvanized Ahmad's resolve to oppose the Kabul government. But eight years of fighting hurt his militia band. Ahmad also took four wives and had eight children.

"My children became more important than war," he said. "The government offered us a good deal. We run our villages ourselves and have peace. Is that such a strange thing?"

St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch

1/23

## Legislators Send Letter to Baker On Kabul Shift

NYT 2/9

By ELAINE SCIOLINO  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 8 -- Senator Bob Dole, the minority leader, and seven other lawmakers sent a letter to Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d today expressing concern about a shift in United States policy toward Afghanistan.

The letter, drafted by Senator Robert C. Byrd, the West Virginia Democrat, was cabled to Mr. Baker in Moscow. It implicitly criticizes the Bush Administration, saying that any transitional role for President Najibullah in an Afghan Government is unacceptable.

"The endorsement of any so-called 'transitional' government which includes Najibullah and/or his close associates would put the United States into the unconscionable position of legitimizing a regime which presided over the brutalization of the Afghan people and the destruction of the very fabric of their society over a decade of killing and armed occupation," the letter said.

It urged the United States to continue sending military and nonmilitary assistance to the Afghan rebels, who are fighting to overthrow the Soviet-installed Najibullah Government until after Mr. Najibullah and his associates are removed from power. Soviet military assistance to the Kabul Government has stopped and the Government no longer has an unfair military advantage because of stockpiled Soviet weapons.

Administration officials said that the lawmakers misunderstood the American proposal, which Mr. Baker presented today to Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union. Those officials said the only policy change is that the United States has dropped its demand that Mr. Najibullah leave before negotiations for a transfer of power can begin. Now the Administration is saying that Mr. Najibullah can stay in power for an unspecified time during negotiations, but must eventually step down from power and cannot take part in either a transitional or permanent government.

The letter indicated the unwillingness of some lawmakers to accept any softening of the Administration's Afghan policy.

"The American proposal is a serious mistake, a tragic mistake, and undercuts a decade of bipartisan policy," said Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, the conservative Republican Senator from New Hampshire who has long advocated a military victory over the rebels. "It gives Najibullah and his cronies a foot in the door to influence any interim government that emerges."

The national security adviser to Republican leadership, Al Lehn, said that Senator Dole, a Kansas Republican, had been briefed by the Administration on the message Mr. Baker was taking to Moscow and that the senator felt comfortable with it. But, Mr. Lehn said, Mr. Dole "wanted to indicate that this was a matter of considerable sensitivity on the Hill and that the Administration should touch all bases if there is a change in the thrust and implementation of the policy."

White House and State Department officials briefed lawmakers this week on American policy toward Afghanistan and the Baker proposal to Mr. Shevardnadze in an effort to convince them that the ultimate goal -- the removal from power of Mr. Najibullah and his close associates -- remains the same. The officials also urged some lawmakers not to sign the letter, which was hastily drafted on the eve of Mr. Baker's departure.



# What Eastern Connecticut's Hamid Akberzai does on his summer vacations

By MICHAEL GREENWOOD  
Courant Correspondent

**W**ILLIMANTIC—While most of his peers at Eastern Connecticut State University are spending their summer months working on tans or waiting tables, Hamid Akberzai will be busy trying to topple a government.

In May, when classes end, Akberzai, 25, will return to Afghanistan to rejoin the mujahedeen in its war against the Soviet-backed government.

That may mean again eating raw onions with bread and nights sleeping in caves or makeshift tents, using his rifle as a pillow. "For me, personally, every Afghan is morally responsible to serve the people," Akberzai said.

For the past three years, Akberzai's life has been one of extremes.

For eight months of the year, he is an ECSU student, carrying school books and hurrying to classes to study economics and political science, his dual major.

For the remaining months, he lugs his AK-47 assault rifle through Afghanistan's rugged steppes and valleys, helping stage surprise hit-and-run attacks on government outposts.

With dark, piercing eyes that rarely blink, Akberzai's vision is firmly set on his homeland's future. "That is where my heart is," said Akberzai, a member of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, one of seven guerrilla groups which fought the Soviet Union to a stalemate for 10 grueling years. The movement has since turned its weapons on the Soviet-supported government in Kabul, the Afghan capital.

"I will always dedicate my life to helping my people. I can never forget them and the suffering they have gone through," he said slowly, in a soft, even voice.

A brownish pakul, a traditional Afghan hat roughly resembling a beret, tops his thick curly black hair. On his feet, a sign of his sojourn in America, he wears white Puma tennis shoes.

His youth in Afghanistan was pastoral. Living on the family farm on the outskirts of Kabul, Akberzai attended school and helped harvest the crops and, with his sister and five brothers, cared for the cows and horses.

"It was a very peaceful life," he reminisced, while sitting in a dimly lighted college lounge several weeks ago.

In 1979, though, that all changed. "The sky was just full of planes just one after another," he remembers of the day when the Soviet Union invaded the country to support a pro-Soviet coup.

Less than a year later, at age 16, Akberzai made a personal decision, one that has not diminished to this day: he would help free his country.

With his parent's encouragement and a few companions, he set off on a

10-day hike over the rugged Afghan terrain to join the loosely organized resistance that was starting to form in neighboring Pakistan.

"I was very young and innocent," Akberzai said about finding himself separated from his family, whom he would not see again for eight years until they were reunited in a Pakistani refugee camp.

"It was psychologically very difficult for me," he said.

While most Americans his age were getting drivers' licenses, Akberzai and 12 companions daily were facing east toward Mecca, praying to Allah for protection before staging raids on Soviet outposts. The first raid was on a camp near his former high school.

Armed with three archaic British rifles and homemade grenades, they destroyed a portion of the base before quickly disappearing into the cover of the countryside.

"I was scared and horrified," Akberzai said of the experience. His imposing six-foot muscular figure and full black beard belie the gentle and thoughtful person inside.

"I wish we never used guns and this military strategy to regain our freedom, but there was no choice," he said. "You fight for your freedom, for your national integrity and for your national pride."

For the next several years, his life was divided between the battlefield and the Pakistani refugee camps where some four million displaced Afghans fled, roughly a third of the population. Today the refugees still live in vast tent communities, he said.

Akberzai became involved with international relief agencies at this time, helping to coordinate and deliver supplies for the refugees.

He also taught himself English, his fifth language, so he could assist foreign journalists and get the story of the Afghan conflict to the outside world, he said. Because of this, he befriended Jan Goodwin, an editor for Ladies Home Journal, who came to write a book on Afghanistan and changed Akberzai's life in the process.

For three months, she accompanied the mujahedeen on their guerrilla operations through the country, and saw bombed villages, skirmishes and life on the run, with Akberzai as her guide and translator.

After she wrote her book, "Caught in the Crossfire," which she dedicated to Akberzai, she invited him to come to the United States to resume his education.

Akberzai accepted, planning to put the knowledge to use some day in rebuilding his tattered country, he said.

While in the United States, the Afghan cause is still foremost in Akberzai's mind. Frequently interrupting his class schedule to travel around the country, he has addressed Congress about the war and also has spoken with students at numerous universities, including Harvard, Yale and Princeton.

The cause of Afghanistan is always more important than attending a small class," he said.

## LETTERS

To the Editor:

In his review of the book AFGHANISTAN - THE GREAT GAME REVISITED, Wendell Minnick correctly notes that the book went to press before the conclusion of the negotiations that led to the withdrawal of overt Soviet ground forces. Since the negotiations - and the contents of the settlement - were held secret until after the resulting accords had been signed in Geneva, it was not possible to discuss them in detail in the 1st edition.

However, the forthcoming 2nd edition of the book has been enlarged to include a lengthy chapter on the negotiations, their results, and their consequences, along with an appendix containing the substantive portions of the official text of the Geneva Accords.

Your readers may also be interested to know that the book is available in paperback @ \$19.95, with reduced rates for quantity orders in either paperback or hardcover. (It is already being used as a text book at a number of major colleges and universities.

Sincerely,

Rosanne Klass

## Afghan reporter killed in Kandahar

An Afghan reporter and aid worker, Shah Mohammad Bazgar, was killed in an ambush on November 24 when he was going to Kandahar.

In the incident several other people were injured. Bazgar, 40, was a member of CNRS, a French research institute, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. He started to travel to Afghanistan to shoot films and photographs.

In France he organized meetings in which he spoke about Afghanistan and showed films and slides.

He was the co-author of *La Resistance au Coeur*, a book on the war in Afghanistan. Bazgar hailed from Ningarhar province and was affiliated with Hezb Islami (Khalis).

AFGHANews 12/15

A Porcupine speaking to  
its baby says, "O my child  
of velvet."


غار پشت چوپي غور دا  
ميگرید مثل پوه دا

He also came to envy the peace and stability he found in Connecticut, and hopes someday to help transplant it to his own nation. "Sometimes I was feeling jealous," Akberzai said. "What is it that have we done wrong?"

He hopes to enter and complete a graduate program and then return to Afghanistan to start the long process of rebuilding his country, something he estimates will take a minimum of 10 years.

Akberzai dreams of returning to his rural past, living on a small farm like his parents and perhaps marrying. To his children, he would pass on the tragedy of what has happened to Afghanistan.

"It will be part of my memory," Akberzai said. "I will teach it to the next generation, to my children, who the Soviets are and what they did to [our] country."



■ Hamid Akberzai

The Hartford Courant

FEBRUARY 18, 1990

# ABSTRACTS

NGOs and the Afghan War: the Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid by Helga Baitenmann in the January 1990 issue of THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY.

An examination of NGOs in Afghanistan, the nature of their work, motivations & effectiveness in the context of competing interests of the different parties of the Afghan conflict. Refugee, cross-border & advocacy NGOs are drawn into the power battles between parties through a web of licenses to operate in a particular area & negotiations with leaders of competing political factions. NGOs, especially cross-border ones, strengthen the base of the insurgency, enabling it to feed itself, & legitimize it with their presence. Advocacy NGOs are more overtly political in their campaigning & lobbying nature & often try to influence the politics of the resistance movement. Many NGOs are funded by the US Government. They often serve as instruments of US foreign policy & many have links with right-wing think-tanks. This perspective has profound implications for NGO activity in the rest of the Third World.

Afghanistan: The Trajectory of Internal Alignments by Robert Canfield in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Vol. 43, #4, Autumn 1989.

Because of the diverse social alignments and the rapid changes that have been taking place in Afghanistan, the course of events in the country remains uncertain. As the war winds die down the social alignments in place will no doubt shape the configuration of alignments that will emerge in peace time; they will define the problems that have to be resolved. This article examines some of the disparate trends in the social alignments of Afghanistan - from those common on local levels to those in the country as a whole - and also considers their significance for the future. An examination of the configuration of social alignments in the country before the war is followed by a look at the major changes in social alignments in the last decade of the war, and then by an analysis of the problems entailed in reestablishing a viable ruling institution for the country.

Aid in Afghanistan - Limitations & Possibilities by Anders Fange in REFUGE, Oct. 1989.

We always tend to look upon the world through glasses colored by our own political & cultural experiences. To an extent it is unavoidable but the problem increases the higher up in the bureaucracies we get. The closer to heaven, the less the understanding of what actually is going on, of the problems & the specific conditions in a certain environment. In this regard, Afghanistan is not a unique case. The misconceptions are many, & one which concerns aid is the belief that it is somehow possible to execute conventional & large-scale aid operations in Afghanistan. That is not the case. However, this is not to say that it is impossible to organize humanitarian aid efforts at all. Aid operations are being carried out now & have been by NGOs since the beginning of the war. The crucial point is to understand both the limitations & the possibilities of aid in the extremely politicized environment of Afghanistan. The Geneva accords marked the entry of the UN. So far, the main channel for UN agencies into Afghanistan has been to support projects run by NGOs. The UN & its aid agencies have their relative strength in an int'l network, established relations with governments, technical expertise, organizational resources for huge programs executed with governments as counterparts, financial resources, etc. Their weaknesses are primarily top heaviness, competition & mistrust between the agencies, rigid rules &, consequently, a reluctance to delegate authority. There is a need for a clearer definition of roles. As long as there is no effective central authority in Afghanistan to act as a counterpart to the UN system, NGOs with their more pragmatic approach, greater flexibility & field experience, must shoulder the main burden of project work. The UN should actively involve itself in issues like supply, technical & financial support, & in coordination, monitoring & evaluation of field work. This will not only push the NGOs to correct mistakes & upgrade

performances, but will also teach UN personnel about conditions in the field. The UN needs the NGOs and the NGOs need the UN; the people of Afghanistan need them both.

AFGHANISTAN & THE SOVIET UNION - COLLISION & TRANSFORMATION, edited by Milan Hauner & Robert Canfield. Westview Press, January 1989.

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has generated a number of issues that must be considered in a long-term context—all the more so now that the Soviets have begun withdrawing their troops from the country. The result of a multidisciplinary effort by specialists from wide-ranging disciplines and with varied experience, this book focuses on several vitally important transformations in the region that will affect the future of Afghanistan's relations with its neighbors, especially with the Soviet Union.

Because of these changes, Greater Central Asia is becoming more central in Eurasian affairs. The introduction of modern systems of transportation and communication contribute to this process by effectively bringing the peoples of this region closer to other peoples and civilizations. The resources of Western Siberia and Soviet Central Asia are drawing Soviet investment into the region. Similarly, the mineral and fuel deposits of Afghanistan could become the

object of new extraction activities. Moreover, Soviet Central Asia is the "land bridge" between the eastern lands of the Soviet empire and its western metropolis, vital in peacetime but even more crucial in the event of a two-front war. And despite the disappointments of the war for the Soviets, Afghanistan will remain important to the Soviet Union because of its proximity and its central location.

In addition to material developments, there have been decisive changes in the "human factor" in Greater Central Asia. Islamism has become prominent in the political affairs of both Iran and Afghanistan, and the peoples of Soviet Central Asia have become more assertive in the use of Islamic forms to express their rejection

of Russian culture and, to some degree, of the Soviet system. This is a development of some importance because the Central Asian Muslims, owing to their more rapid population growth rate, seem likely to exert even more influence

on affairs within the empire. In the whole region Islamic rhetoric may continue to be used to define local and national interests in contrast to Soviet and Western capitalist interests.

These material and cultural developments, although in some ways operating in different directions, are working together to add to the geopolitical importance of Greater Central Asia. And as this little-known region is developed it could become even more central as a conduit for the transfer of goods, personnel, and ideas—and thus for the exertion of influence and power—between the Soviet Union and nations of South Asia and the Middle East. Modern military power, the political ideologies of disparate civilizations, and the entrepreneurial interests of the world economic system are likely to converge with growing force in Greater Central Asia.

Contents: THE HUMAN FACTOR. The Collision of Evolutionary Process and Islamic Ideology in Greater Central Asia—Robert L. Canfield. *The Mujahidin and the Preservation of Afghan Culture*—Olivier Roy. *The Sovietization of Afghanistan*—O. Roy. *THE GEO-POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE* Central Asia and the Soviet "Midlands": Regional Position and Economic Integration—Leslie Dienes. *Afghanistan Resources and Soviet Policy in Central and South Asia*—John F. Shroder, Jr. *Afghanistan and the Transport Infrastructures of Turkistan*—Victor L. Mote. *The Soviet Geoeconomic Dilemma*—Milan Hauner.

## "Negative Symmetry": Not the Way to Peace

David C. Isby

"Negative symmetry" is a new tool to implement old policies. Its new packaging is appealing to many in Washington. "Negative symmetry's" surface appeal is obvious; a linked cut-off of all foreign aid to the Afghan resistance. Moscow's proposal is comprehensive, linking this "negative symmetry" to a cease-fire and the start of peace talks with a "16-chair" formula. This would include the seven Peshawar-based Afghan resistance parties, the eight Iran-based Afghan resistance parties, and the communist Kabul regime. This combination - a cut-off of arms, a cease-fire, and negotiations - certainly has appeal at first glance. But the way the Soviets have structured their position suggests that they are more interested in keeping the current regime in Kabul in power than ending the war.

"Negative Symmetry" will bring neither peace nor effective negotiations. A "16-chair" process is unacceptable to both the Peshawar-based parties and the field commanders inside Afghanistan who regard the Kabul regime as ab initio illegitimate. Rather, the Soviets hope for a long dragged-out process in which the Kabul regime's secret police and army continue in place until resistance divergences and the disenchantment of its foreign supporters allow the Kabul regime to solidify the status quo. Without the military pressure on Kabul made possible by a strong arms flow, there is little chance of a genuine political settlement that would include the disbandment of the secret police, the transfer of power to a broad-based interim government and the calling of a *loya jirga* and/or elections that could lead to real peace, not the consolidation of the fruits of Moscow's "old thinking".

Excerpts from a "Position Paper" written by David Isby for the COMMITTEE FOR A FREE AFGHANISTAN, 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington DC 20002. The paper was issued on 2/7/90.

An Afghanistan Research and Study department has been opened in the International Study Center of the Foreign Ministry of Iran.

In the inaugural session of the Department some Afghan and Iranian scholars participated.

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An Iranian official in charge of Afghan refugees has said that 700,000 Afghan refugees live in Khurasan province, of which 170,000 live in the refugee camps in Bairjand and Qaynat along the border with Afghanistan. The refugees in the camps are provided with food and medical assistance.



# ORGANIZATIONS

The HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE & its WOMEN'S TAKS FORCE have prepared a 1-page calendar for the year 1369 (begins March 21). The calendar has Western solar, Afghan/Iranian solar & Islamic lunar dates. Proceeds will go to projects supported by the Committee, including the Afghan Aid Assn. & Lycee Malalai in Peshawar. The group is preparing a book on maternal & child care, in Dari, for Afghan refugees in the Chicago area. The calendars are \$2.50 each which includes shipping & handling, & can be ordered from HRAC, %Farkhunda Fakhri, 2055 W. Lunt Ave., Chicago, IL 60640. Voluntary contributions are welcome. Make checks payable to HRAC.



(1) The ARC provides funds needed for sudden emergencies or when there is no time to go through the cumbersome procedures required by government agencies.

(2) The ARC supports projects, often small but valuable, that don't fit into the programs of the big official aid agencies and could not be carried out without private support.

(3) The ARC serves as a catalyst, providing seed money for pilot projects which, if successful, may lead to major programs with largescale official funding...

HUMAN CONCERN INT'L, Box 3984, Station C, Ottawa, Ont., Canada K1Y4P2, has just issued a 64-page guide, "Afghanistan: a Forgotten War" by Jane Thomas. In French & English, the publication is free but HCI would appreciate donations for postage (Can.\$2.35). Financial assistance was provided by the Canadian Int'l Development Agency. The book is full of information & looks as if it would be an excellent guide for teachers:

Before the war, although culturally rich, Afghanistan was one of the poorest, least developed countries in the world. The 1978 coup, the 1979 invasion and war has resulted in:	
number of refugees externally over	5,000,000
number of refugee internally	2,000,000
percentage of Afghans who are refugees	50%
number of Afghans killed 1980-1987	1,240,000
percentage killed	9%
number of war disabled	275,000
percentage of villages destroyed	50%
agricultural production down	50%
number of war widows and orphans	400,000
literacy rate	13%
educational facilities reduced by	78%
child death rate	highest in world
rate of birth related deaths of mothers	highest in world
life expectancy (39 years)	lowest in world

Excerpted from News from the ARC, Winter 1989/90

## THE AFGHANISTAN RELIEF COMMITTEE

ARC was established in November 1979, before the invasion, by a group of people (including all of the former U.S. ambassadors to Kabul) who were aware of the terrible events already occurring there.

Soon after the communists seized power in April 1978, popular resistance emerged. By autumn 1979, more than 250,000 Afghan refugees had fled to Pakistan, but none of the major international relief agencies had begun to provide aid. The Committee was founded to try to help them, the first such organization in this country. A few weeks later, the Soviet army invaded. Millions of refugees began to pour across the border. On January 4, 1980, the ARC received its legal charter and our work began.

From the start, we have concentrated on two functions: direct humanitarian aid to the Afghan people — primarily medical, food and educational aid — and informing the American public.

We have always focussed on three particular aspects which, we feel, enable us to do the maximum good with limited funds:

## CAHSO REPORT

The upshot of the AFGHANISTAN RELIEF COMMITTEE's 3rd Conference of Afghanistan Humanitarian Support Organizations, held last month in New York, was that this year will be a turning point in the work of NGOs. The interest of the major donor nations has lessened due to their perceptions that the major threat is over — the Soviet troops have gone; the mujahideen are disorganized & unable to threaten the Kabul regime which, according to the media, seems to be gaining strength; rapid changes in Eastern Europe have superseded concerns about Afghanistan. Therefore, it is urgent that all NGOs dealing with Afghan refugees make great efforts to keep their concerns in front of donor gov'ts.

Len Oppenheim

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Bizarre Bazaar" by Jake Border appeared in the January 1990 issue of SOLDIER OF FORTUNE. Border also wrote "Afghan Walkabout" which appeared in the February issue.

"Afghans - Now They Blame America" by John F. Burns in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 4; an excerpt appeared in the LA DAILY NEWS on the same date.

"First Person Feminine" by Annick Roulet-Billard in REFUGEES, November, 1989. Pp 24-26.

"Afghanistan gibt es noch," an interview with Amin Wardak, in ZEITBILD, 24/89, 30 November, 1989.

Two articles from INSIGHT: "Guerrillas on Unfamiliar Turf in Crucial Propaganda Battle" in the 7/24/89 issue & "Resistance Forces Seem Unable to Resist Infighting" in the 9/11/89 issue.

TIMUR AND THE PRINCELY VISION Persian Art & Culture in the 15th Century by Thomas W. Lentz & Glenn D. Lowry. Smithsonian Inst. Press, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17294-0900. 250 color, 146 b & w illus. 400 pp. \$75.

THE ARTS OF PERSIA, edited by R.W. Ferrier, Yale Univ. Press, Dept. 132, 92A Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520. 250 b/w + 150 color illus. \$60.

"The War the West Ignored" by Robert Kaplan in THE READER'S DIGEST, January 1990, is an extract from his book, SOLDIERS OF GOD, published by Houghton Mifflin, 2 Park Street, Boston, MA 02108. \$19.95.

"A Reporter at Large - Balochistan" by Mary Anne Weaver in THE NEW YORKER, January 15, 1990.

Vol. I, #1 of FREEDOM MEDICINE's ALUMNI NEWS came out this winter. The 4-page publication carries information on the organization's projects in Afghanistan, Pakistan & SE Asia.

"Un Grain dans la Machine. Une Evasion Spirituelle des Prisons Kaboul" by Alain Guillo. Paris, Robert Laffont, 1989. 310 pp.

PERSIAN DRAWINGS IN THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART by Marie Lukens Swietochowski & Susan Babaie is the catalogue for an exhibition held at the Metropolitan from 9/13-12/31/89. 87 pp. Paper. \$7.95.

A few artifacts from Afghanistan appear in THE MUSEUM OF ORIENTAL ART MOSCOW, published by Aurora Art Publishers, Leningrad, 1988. Nina Karpova wrote the Near & Middle East section of the book. (The Museum was founded by decree in October, 1918.) ISBN 5-7300-0096-0. 232 pp. \$60.

"NGOs & the Afghan War: the Politicisation of humanitarian aid" by Helga Baitenmann appeared in the January 1990 issue of THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, New Zealand House (13th Floor), Haymarket, London SW1 4TS. An abstract is on p. 28.

The first issue of NEWS FROM THE AFGHANISTAN RELIEF COMMITTEE came out this winter. The 4-page publication has a summary of recent developments and articles on ARC activities. Copies are available from the Committee, 18th Floor, 667 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10021.

AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT GAME REVISITED by Rosanne Klass is available in Great Britain from the University Press of America, 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU. Cloth \$21.50, Paper \$14.50.

L'OBSERVATEUR AFGHAN - BULLETIN D'INFORMATION BI-MENSUEL began publication on 1/15/90. The 1st issue contained 6 pages of a chronology of events from November 22 through 1/11/90. The 2nd issue had more editorial comment along with the chronology. Subscriptions are available from "ANLF Paris," 12 Square Henri Regnault, 92400 Courbevoie - La Defense, France, for 350 FF a year.

AFGANISTAN: ISTORIYA, EKONOMIKA, KULTURA, edited by Yuri Gankovskii, Nauka, Moscow, 1989. 268 pp.

"Post-Soviet Afghanistan: The Position of the Minorities" by Richard Newell in ASIAN SURVEY, XXIX, #11. 11/89.

The Afghan Jihad Works Translation Centre in Peshawar has published Marek Sliwinski's AFGHANISTAN 1978-87 - WAR, DEMOGRAPHY & SOCIETY in Dari.



DUST OF THE SAINTS by Radek Sikorski, Chatto & Windus Ltd., 30 Dedford Sq., London WC1B 3SG. 274 pp. 14.95. An account of the author's trip thru western Afghanistan.

**The book is decorated with some beautiful pictures taken by the writer, and supplemented with illustrations and maps to make it easy for the reader understand. The cover is adorned with a picture of Commander Ismael Khan on horseback.**

THE MODERN UZBEKS From the 14th Century to the Present, a cultural history, by Edward Allworth, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR series, Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305-6010. Ca. 440 pp. March 1990, Cloth \$39.95; paper \$24.95. The author concentrates especially on the imperial Russian and Soviet periods of history, but also gives earlier periods of Uzbek history solid scholarly assessment. Meticulously analyzed are Uzbek relations with their foreign rulers, the Uzbek response to Russification and modernization, and the ethnic and religious issues in Uzbek society.

BEYOND AFGHANISTAN: THE EMERGING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, edited by Leo Rose & Kamal Matinuddin, Inst. of East Asian Studies, 2223 Fulton St., 6th Floor, Berkeley, CA 94720, 1989. 352 pp. \$20.

"Mission: Afghanistan" by Mary Williams Walsh in the COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, Jan./Feb. 1990. This is a juicy one & we'll include it in the May issue. In the meantime see "The Afghan Scam" by Ms Walsh's husband, Lawrence Walsh, on pp. 24-25).

New from Kabul: IN CONTINUATION OF INTERFERENCES, October 1989. 82 pp; RED CRESCENT - Exporter of White Death Barons of 'Peshawar Narcotic Club' Have Occupied American-European Bazaars, February, 1990. 46 pp.

In the March issue of NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Victor Sarianidi writes on the treasures of Tillya Tepe: he states that the golden objects were never removed from Afghanistan & should be in Kabul; however, he is not sure of their whereabouts now. [We hope to have this in the May issue.]

The ACBAR Resource & Information Centre (ARIC) BULLETIN made its debut in January. The publication will present a monthly update on ARIC's acquisitions, services & special events.

*Music of Afghanistan: Professional Musicians in the City of Herat.* By JOHN BAILY. Cambridge Studies in Ethnomusicology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. \$49.50 (cloth); \$17.95 (paper).

Ethnomusicological monographs on Afghanistan may not be many but they have been fortunate in their authors. Compared to earlier publications by Mark Shubin and Hiromi Lorraine Sakata, John Baily's excellent study has a more narrowly defined topic—the professional musicians of Herat up to the Soviet intervention—which he illumines with comprehensive breadth. Based on extensive fieldwork among the musicians he studied and studied with, Baily's observations about professional music making in Herat concern its recent and more distant history, the differing roles of Iran influence (via Khorasan) and Hindustani influence (via the Kabul court), the place of indigenous local traditions, the status of amateur-turned-professional versus hereditary professional musicians, the significance of musical theory, types of musical structures and repertory, the social organization of music, contexts for performance, and the value of music in this Islamic context. Although concerned mainly with male professional musicians, Baily includes some information about the activities of female professionals as well, for which he acknowledges indebtedness to his wife, Veronica Doubleday.

Although the professional musicians perform a variety of vocal and instrumental genres—each of which Baily carefully describes (a tape of the examples is also available)—it is evident that for them the most significant portion of their repertory is derived from Hindustani art music. "Musicians' music," it is not much appreciated by their patrons, and however much satisfaction they themselves receive from its performance, it serves at the same time to point out their inadequacies as musicians who live at the extreme periphery of a foreign, elite musical tradition to which they have only recently adapted. The musicians' reverence for the sound of *klāsh* music extends as well to the imposing and intimidating edifice of theory attached to it, the *'ilm-e musiqi* (science of music). "The knowledge of this science was an important part of *honarmand* [artist] status and high rank. It rendered respectable both music and musicians: the very possibility of speech discourse about the structural elements of music changed the status of music in an Islamic society which regarded it with some suspicion" (p. 162).

Aesthetic appreciation for Hindustani music among Herati professional musicians is enhanced by its high status as court music as well as by its ability to give the art an intellectual content that helps to distance it from mere sensual indulgence. In considering the Islamic view of music, Baily refers to often-cited literature but more interestingly quotes from answers to questions he presented to mullahs whose services included such interpretations of Islamic law. He concludes that tolerance for music has increased somewhat in recent years, but the position of the musician remains equivocal despite the elevation of his art by such changes as the introduction of "scientific" theory. "Amir Jan spoke to me of there being fourteen *'ilms* recognized by the mullahs, one of them being music. When I asked him how that could be, given the bad name of music from the mullahs' point of view, he replied, with a twinkle in his eye, that perhaps they called it an *'ilm-e shatan*, 'a science of Satan'" (p. 162).

Despite—or perhaps because of—its peculiar significance in the view of Herati musicians, the *'ilm-e musiqi* remains more a "representational model" than an "operational" one as Baily describes it, using terms borrowed from Peter Caws, as such it is less consistently used in the acquisition and transference of musical skills than it is in the land of its origin, but it is equally important in establishing music's capacity for intellectual codification.

The ambiguous position of music and its practitioners in Herati life is the result of an intricate and complex matrix of social, cultural, conceptual, historical, and aesthetic threads, all of which Baily has presented and interpreted with admirable lucidity. The lack of a tortured ideological framework and unnecessary jargon make this musical ethnography a suitable companion to the equally readable study of an Amazonian people by Anthony Seeger in the same series. Perhaps the one improvement to be wished for would be a somewhat more helpful index. Finally, one might wish that the Cambridge University Press, which puts a high price on these monographs, would see fit to use better paper—the print shows through the present paper—and to use gutter margins wide enough to make it unnecessary to bend the binding. The quality of Baily's text and others in the series deserves better treatment.

CHARLES CAPWELL  
THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Vol. 45, #4, Nov. 1989

## BOOK REVIEWS

SHADOW OVER AFGHANISTAN: An Autobiography of an Afghan Family During the Years of Soviet Subversive Activity which Led to the Occupation of Afghanistan, Fazel Rahman Fazel, San Mateo (CA 94402): Western Book Journal Press, 1989. 324 pp. Many photos, glossary. \$12.50.

There is a subtle sense of antiquity and other-worldness about this book before one even opens it, perhaps brought on by the long subtitle (whose first word, one feels, should have been "Being..."). That first impression turns out to be right. Fazel has written a book in the style of the old Afghan story-teller, a Homeric legend that traces his own autobiography against a backdrop of Afghan politics as he perceived them. The book unfolds in a series of flashbacks, so that one follows Fazel's experiences from December 1979 forward on one track, with reversions to his earlier years and the politics of those days interspersed on another track. Both lines, fortunately, are consecutive. The writing is richly descriptive (how better to portray the noise of a helicopter than "chuddering"), and Fazel works in a good deal of Afghan history through various devices, including a guided tour of Kabul for his German girl friend.

The main message, however, is the indomitable spirit of the Afghans and how that has manifested itself despite the Soviet intrigues before the invasion and their cruelties after it. It is not unlikely that the legend Fazel unfolds (or something very like it) will endure longer in his society than any of the foreign works about Afghanistan - some popular, some scholarly - that have proliferated in the last 10 years.

This is both a good and a bad thing. If one cares passionately about historical precision, this book is not where to find it. On the very first page, Fazel describes sunshine in Kabul on December 26, 1979, when in fact it was snowing there through that whole Christmas weekend. The following day, President Hafizullah Amin was not, as Fazel implies, under attack in the presidential palace but in Darulaman, some miles away. On page 231, the author claims that in 1979 Hafizullah Amin declared Soviet Ambassador Puzanov persona non grata and had him expelled within 4 hours after the ambassador had tried to lure Amin into an ambush. In fact, the abortive ambush occurred in early September, and Puzanov only left in November. And so on. The historical nitpicker can shred this book with ridiculous ease.

Other points are less demonstrably wrong but dubious at best. With convincing realism, for example, Daoud is described as meeting his end at the hands of Minister of Commerce Jalalar, who is pictured drawing his revolver and putting two bullets in the president's heart as the pro-Soviet Afghan army forces close in on the presidential palace. (Most accounts have Daoud and his entire family gunned down by the rebellious troops after he shot and wounded the officer demanding his surrender.) Under the Soviet occupation, a small boy shoots at a Soviet soldier on a tank with his slingshot, and the tank responds by opening fire with its cannon on the surrounding crowd. (There are enough documented atrocities, even in the Soviet press, without resorting to this unlikely scenario.)

But one doesn't demand historical accuracy in Homer, and one shouldn't expect it of an Afghan story-teller. Moreover, it would be a bad error to dismiss this book as merely an accumulation of exaggerations and misinformation. Just as Homer reveals so much about the society of ancient Greece, so Fazel directly and indirectly lets us in on the values and thought processes of Afghans in general - and his own in particular. Automatic exaggeration is part of that picture, as are a measure of preening and a black-white outlook on the world that permits few grays. (The villains - e.g., Daoud - are villainous through and through, with no redeeming social virtues, just as the heroes are totally heroic.) If these are negative aspects, they are offset by the positive ones: Afghan individualism, hospitality, loyalty, family orientation,

generosity, self-sufficiency, religiosity. If the objectivity and truthfulness of individual events in the book are in question, the underlying human values are not.

The reader who already knows Afghanistan and the Afghans will find fond memories flooding in as he reads; the one who doesn't is in for a treat.

Just don't use the book as a historical research tool.

Anthony Arnold  
Novato, California

CHRONIQUE D'UN TEMOIN PRIVILIGIE: Vol.1, 1979, LA TERREUR, Lettres d'Afghanistan de Serge de Beaureceuil; Centre de Recherches et d'Etudes Documentaires sur l'Afghanistan; n.d.; 130 pp.

Nothing serves the cause of history better than a contemporary account written as events occur, before subsequent happenings lend a coloration: "Oh, that's why that was that way!" and excusable selectivity. So historians concerned with the epic struggle in Afghanistan are fortunate that the Rev. Serge de Beaureceuil, a Dominican professor at Lycee Esteqlal, wrote so many letters to his friends abroad and that those letters, with the minutiae of everyday life in Kabul in 1979, are now published, along with accounts by a few other French observers. Subsequent volumes are planned for the years up to 1983. At one point the Rev. de Beaureceuil apologizes for the random nature of his remarks..."these letters of broken sticks. I give you the news as it comes into my head." That is precisely the value of this paperback book.

Sinister indeed is the Kabul regime's plan for education. Scholarship students who had been accepted in Western countries were ordered to apply to Eastern countries. A piecemeal plan was set on course to suppress the use of French in schools operated for many years by France. First those in the beginning grades would be taught in Dari, not in French. Next year the second grade would also, then the next... and eventually the French language would disappear. And the authorities said with a straight face that students should learn to write the words in 1st grade, but wait until the 2nd grade to understand them.

Unwittingly the Kabul authorities took one cue from a French writer who condensed the history of man into 3 phrases: "They were born, they suffered, they died." The Marxist gov't of Afghanistan ordered 3 words to be topmost in their country's history: "Imperialism, Feudalism, Khalq"...the latter, of course, being the Communist faction currently in power.

Changes in power bases are depicted from a new viewpoint. The Rev. de Beaureceuil was almost arrested in September, 1979, when power shifted suddenly from Taraki to Amin. The Afghan who hung Amin's photograph in its obligatory spot in the school hit the nail too hard. The glass was broken. The Rev de Beaureceuil had to prove he didn't do it. After December 27, the photograph of Taraki was rescued from a trash bin and restored to honor.

More touching is the account by Michel Verron, an expert with UNESCO. (His UN office was headed by a Bulgarian sent to replace the Englishman whom the UN thought less cooperative with the regime.) On December 29, 2 days after the Soviet invasion, he was visited by disconsolate Afghans who had collaborated with the gov't but now, since the gov't was Khalq and Parcham was in power, they wondered what would become of them. Their lips did not utter the words "Russian" or "Soviet," only "they." "How can we speak of a New Afghanistan? We are in a colonial era," went one complaint. "How can we talk about building socialism today when our priority is a struggle for national liberation?" The speaker ended, "Now we are all rebels." We look forward to the remainder of this valuable series.

Rhea Talley Stewart  
Manchester, Connecticut

# THE KABUL TIMES

ESTABLISHED 1966

## Measures for stable rate of convertible currency

The Tuesday's periodic session of the Council of Ministers Executive Committee, chaired by its Chairman Sultan Ali Keshmand and attended by Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and some department heads studied the issues connected with the partial stability of the rate of convertible currency against Afghan money. It was pointed that of late the conversion rate of some convertible currency has had an ascending trend against Afghan money and has badly affected the prices of imported goods. To maintain the stability of the rate, it was decided:

1— To encourage export, the surplus of the convertible currency of export items should be purchased by the banks at free market rate and the earlier decision on the purchase of a certain percentage of export items at

official rate of Da Afghanistan Bank be cancelled.

2— The Ministries of Commerce, Finance and the Da Afghanistan Bank were given the duty to conduct some studies and take concrete measures to encourage the exports through easing the process of their documents and reviewing the export commissions. They have to advance certain proposals to the Council of Ministers for facilitating the import of prime commodities needed by the people.

3— The sale of currency to state institutions for meeting their needs can take place only through the bank and the purchase of convertible currency by the state institutions from the market has to be seriously avoided.

4— A resolution of the

Council of Ministers has given an emphatic instruction to ministries and state departments to observe certain norms of economization in spending convertible currency.

That apart, the yesterday's session thoroughly discussed the state of activity of Jangalak factory. It was pointed out that Jangalak Factory, being one of the biggest industrial establishments in the country, has been constructed with the financial and technical assistance of the Soviet Union.

The noteworthy productions of the factory are mobile and immobile tankers of various capacities and overall repair of KAMAZ vehicles. During the past three years, some 2134 engines of KAMAZ vehicles and over 2000 tankers were repaired and

made by the factory. Despite the above accomplishments, the shortcomings and problems in the function of the factory were underlined and a resolution passed in this respect, envisaging certain directions for further acceleration of the said affairs. The ministries of Mines and Industries, Transport, Finance, Planning and the Ministries of the armed forces were given definite tasks.

Satisfaction was expressed over the contribution of private trade institutions in import of prime commodities, that have got prepared, in accordance with their previous pledges, to import a certain volume of essential goods such as ghee, tea, soap and rice. The Ministry of Commerce was assigned to fix the quota of these trade institutions taking into account the record of their activities. (BIA)

12/20

## President condoles demise of Gen. Gul Mohammad Mangal

KABUL, JAN. 4, (BIA)

We have learned with regret, that retired Staff Officer Lt. General Gul Mohammad Mangal, an outstanding and veteran officer who had enjoyed a special place in the country's army, passed away at the age of 71 of an illness on Tuesday night. (May His Departed Soul be Happy).

To honour the invaluable services of the late, esteemed President Najibullah went yesterday to his home and expressed his deep condolence to

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his relatives. The President described the demise of the retired Lt. General a loss and prayed for his soul.



Late Lt. Gen. Gul Mohammad Mangal.

## Architectural history to be written

A commission assigned for writing the history of the architecture in Afghanistan met yesterday and endorsed the future workplan of the commission.

The commission which was set up under the Association of Architects and Engineers of Afghanistan will assess the history of architecture in Afghanistan and this history will be published

after two years.

As per the request made by the Association of the Architects and Engineers of Afghanistan, this project was proposed by the national commission of UNESCO to UNESCO.

Experienced and outstanding architects and historians of Afghanistan are members of this commission.

11/28

# New Commission to campaign hoarding

KABUL, NOV. 22, (BIA)

The Presidential Office reported that President Najibullah has issued the following decree on the formation of a commission besides the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland:

Presidential decree on the formation of commission under the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland:

To focus serious attention of the state on removing the problems concerning the supply of primarily-needed goods to people, to intensify struggle against sabotage, hoarding of essential goods, foodstuffs and fuel and to audit the organization of affairs towards removing the primary needs of the people and to prevent misuse in the supply and distribution of the goods, the following is approved:

## Article 1:

As per Article 17 of the law for the Council for the Defence of Homeland, a special commission must be formed under the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland with the following composition:

1— Mir Sahab Karwal, member of the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland as chairman of the commission.

2— Mohammad Daoud Razmyar, member of the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland, Mohammad Hakim, Deputy Prime Minister, Sayed Sharufuddin Sharaf, Attorney General, Abdul Karim Mesar, Kabul Mayor, Sharifi, head of Auditing Dept. of the Council of Ministers, Maj. General Mohammad Hashem, Attorney of the

armed forces, Sayed Hussain Fakhri, special attorney of the national security, Baqer Farin deputy minister of State Security, Aziz Ahmad Azizi head of the Anticrime department of the Interior Ministry, Mohammad Hakim General head of the chambers for commerce and industry and Wali, Commander of Kabul City Tsarandoy, as members.

3— Ghulam Mohayuddin Emar, head of the Presidential department for law enforcement organs, as Secretary.

## Article 2:

The commission is assigned to organize serious struggle against sabotage, hoarding of essential goods, and prevent misuse in the distribution of foodstuffs and fuel as well as the coupon items.

## Article 3:

The commission is assigned to assess in its first meeting the norms and measures for storing primary goods, foodstuffs and fuel. In case it needs amendment, the commission should act in accordance with the article two of the law on preventing speculation.

## Article 4:

The commission is bound to create a strict mechanism for controlling the above, cases and should insure its implementation.

## Article 5:

To translate into action the provisions of the decree's second Article, the Commission is assigned to submit through the detection and investigation organs and attorney offices, the culprits and misusers to law at the soonest possible time, and inform the people of the accomplishments of the concerned organs.

## Article 6:

The concerned courts are bound to examine in accordance with the country's enforced laws the submitted cases and issue verdicts at the soonest.

## Article 7:

The Commission is assigned, in order to implement the provisions of the decree, to adopt required decisions and the issues which require the decision of the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland or Presidential orders and decrees, should be presented at the soonest for taking decision upon.

## Article 8:

In order to timely organize the accomplishments of the Commission, a concerned working group should be set up in the

Council of Ministers and the Attorney General Office of the Republic under the chairmanship of the commission-members.

## Article 9:

For the realization of the above task, the Commission should attract the cooperation of the concerned state organs and properly use the efforts of the social organizations, citizens and possibilities of private entrepreneurs.

## Article 10:

The commission is bound to submit its monthly report of accomplishments to the Supreme Council for the Defence of Homeland.

**Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan.**

KT 11/22

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ندارې اېږ مگر.


Don't stop a donkey that is not yours.



An Afghan parachutist.



# Academic year 1368



Dr. Neher Mohammad Ejazi.

KT 12/4

The academic year 1368 (1969) is coming to end and preparations for the next year is under way by the ministry of higher and vocational education and various other concerned organs. Entrance examination for the universities and other institutes are going on. Students are admitted under different appropriate categories in the examination, a discussion about the preparations for the next academic year has been held with the academician candidate, Prof. M. M. Ejazi, minister for higher and vocational education of the RA which is presented here. As far as the number of the universities and the plan and conditions of new admissions to the universities are concerned, Prof. Ejazi, said "there are five universities and several institutes in the country.

They are: Kabul university, the Islamic research and studies university, Balkh university, Herat university, Nangarhar university, named after B. Roshan, the institute of Polytechnic institute for training of cadres, the institutes of pedagogy, medical institute, institute for medical education and other institutes for higher studies. Among these, the universities for Islamic research and studies in Herat and Balkh provinces are separate and newly established educational units. The vacancies in the faculties of these universities have

been filled up by 50 to 80% according to the concerned plans and will be completed gradually. It must be mentioned that in all the universities of Afghanistan, 15219 students are being taught by 721 professors at present."

Regarding the manner in which the entrance of the academician-candidate, M.M. Ejazi gave his views as follows. "For the sake of disciplinary considerations in the process of the examinations and admission of all the eligible students in the entrance examination, the following three types of examinations have been proposed.

- entrance examination for the 12th-class graduates of the old system.
- entrance examination for the 11th-class graduates of the new system.
- special entrance examination for the graduates of the vocational schools.

These examinations will be conducted in four rounds and enrollment for each round will be done separately. The first round of the examinations was conducted for the 12th-class female graduates of the Kabul province on 19th November in which 3,200 students were admitted. For the next examination which will be held on 6th December for the 11th-class graduates of the girls' schools, more than 3700 girls have been enrolled so far

The admission plan for the fresh-men for training of new cadres in the organizations for higher education will be approved by the planning ministry of the RA and forwarded to the ministry of higher and vocational studies. According to this plan, about 6550 students will be admitted in various institutes in the coming academic year. Regarding the problems of the students in the provinces where the entrance examination can not be conducted for certain reasons. The minister for higher education of the RA said "the entrance examination in Balkh, Nangarhar, Herat and Jauzjan provinces will be conducted soon and in other provinces where the entrance examination can not be conducted due to some problems, the eligible school graduates who wish to sit in the entrance examination will be brought to the capital with the cooperation of the defence ministry to appear in the examination. The expenditure on lodging and boarding of these students will be borne by the ministry of higher and vocational education.

The entrance examination has been arranged in accordance with the previously established norms. However, due to the prevailing conditions and difficulties existing in schools of the Kabul city in the current academic year, some relative and qualitative changes have been made. We have two different types of examina-

tions this year, one for the 12th-class graduates of the old educational system and the other for the 11th-class graduates of the new system.

Contents of the examination is the same for both the girls and the boys. However, the admission of male students in the entrance examination will be considered according to the existing conscription rules of the country". At the end, the academician candidate, prof. M. M. Ejazi, the minister of higher and vocational education of the RA said "my wishes and those of the leadership of the ministry of higher and vocational education for betterment of the educational conditions in the country consist of the complete realization of the norms of higher and vocational studies which have been promulgated after the kind approval of the president of the RA. These norms have been set for broadening the rights and increasing the creativity and responsibilities of the higher educational organizations for training of national cadres in various areas of science, ongoing of scientific and research activities and realization of individual and social responsibilities of the students through proper understanding of humane and Islamic values, and looking after the scientists and professors for serving the Afghan and the human societies."

(Bakharat)



Students of Kabul University

# Musical art

Musical play is a delicate and lovely artistic phenomenon, constructed from the basic rhythms. A beautiful musical piece is in the first step the products of an experienced musician and dynamic orchestra and finally the performers and the vocalists. The artistic piece taking from the composition to the harmonization should carry a definitive spiritual message. For example, a tragic poem could not eliminate the necessary work of a comic harmony or vice versa. All musical and artistic principles must be observed to better fit the spiritual quest of the people.

These are the words spoken by Abdul Wahab Madedi, an experienced artist of the country in response to questions in an interview with the reporter of PT-AM.

**Question:**  
What is your view about the present conditions of music in our country?

**Answer:**  
Taking note of the problems, such as escap of a number of artists and musicians from the country, conditions are not satisfactory, and I do not see any immediate improvement in the sphere of musical art in the near future in my country.

**Question:**  
Considering the fact that you headed the musical department of the Radio-Television for several years, what is your proposal to improve music in the country?

**Answer:**  
Musical art cannot improve itself with the establishment of a course or creation of a few schools, or procurement of a number of musical instruments. Musical training for the youth should begin with the 13th-14th years of age. Necessary attention should be directed on removing the problems faced by the musical school and the

fine arts college so that the ground get perpetuated for the training of greater numbers of youth inside the country at high levels.

And, steps should be taken for a number of art lovers in the fields of composing, instrumentalists, etc. to be sent to foreign countries, and, a number of musical experts have to be employed for the purpose of training musicians inside the country.

**Question:**  
To what extent you are satisfied with the activities conducted by the fine arts faculty?

**Answer:**  
The teaching procedure in the faculty of fine arts is not only not satisfactory, but it is regretful, because the teaching processes lack methodical procedures, there are very few experienced teachers and there are no adequate number of instruments in the faculty which could be placed at the disposal of students for carrying out their exercises. There is ample space for this purpose as well. And, finally, it is to be pointed out that students who generally have the necessary talents in the field of musical art are enrolled here and those who want to study literature are being enrolled in the fine arts faculty.

**Question:**  
How is the conditions of composing in the country?

**Answer:**  
Frankly speaking, not satisfactory.

**Question:**  
What is your view in regard to folk music?

**Answer:** Since the folk music is a reflector of the wishes and desires of rural inhabitants but, due to certain problems, unfortunately, this fine field of people's music has not undergone any development as well.

**Question:**  
How you have found your relationship with

singing songs and composition?

**Answer:**  
Singing of songs and composing of a song are issues which require quest talent, sufficient time and finally precise attention on the part of a musician. But, I lack these specifications.

**Question:**  
Is it your final answer?

**Answer:**  
It is difficult to say that it is my final answer. May be, due to certain problems, prevailing in our country, we could not be able to score necessary gains in the field of musical art in our country. I am quite confident, that we are in a position to remove the difficulties on the way of development and richness of musical art and this fine and delicate art will definitely emerge flourishing in the near future, Madeddi concluded.

KT 11/29

## talented orator

Mahbuba Jabari is a well-known and talented announcer of Radio Afghanistan, her fine and delicate voice is known to every listener. She has long been working in various programmes of the radio in reading long stories in particular.

In order to know her further and to be better acquainted with this diligent news-reader, we had an interview with her, which is presented below:

**Q.** Please tell me something on your services in the radio and cinema? I began working in Radio Afghanistan in 1965 when its station was located at the Puli-Baghi-Ummu. Initially, I worked with children's programme and family life. Later on, I started work in other programmes too. In 1969, I joined the art and Literature Department of Radio where I was engaged in the preparation of dramas and continuous stories.

For the last five years I have quitted the acting

art and at the moment I am serving as an official at the artistic and documentary films department and read the narration of some films. About my work in the cinema, I should say that in 1971, when a single women was not ready to appear in a film I played, in the first role of a film entitled "Andarzi-Mother". It was the only film I played my role, because due to family problems I could not play in the films any more.

Mahbuba Jabari continued that sometimes back a responsible section of the Artists Union assessed the artistic work and achievements of various artists of the country as a result of this assessment, a great number of artists were dearly appreciated, by meritorious letters and by conferring diplomas, but unfortunately, I was totally forgotten though I was supposed to be considered. When I asked the jury but he simply said that he had worked in the radio, and we only appreciate artists with television background. This has greatly disappointed me.

Mahbuba Jabari added that despite this, she loves her occupation and will strive to further improve her artistic talents. I am really proud that people love my voice and appreciated my artistic endeavours.

She was asked that why she never appeared on the TV, so that the people see her on screen. She

replied that many people know her from her voice whenever they come across to her or talk to her, so no need to appear on TV.



DECEMBER 13, 1988

PERESTROIKA AFGHAN STYLE? Excerpts from Najibullah's speech at a 12/31 meeting commemorating the 25th anniversary of the PDPA. [Adapted from BNA 1/1/90]

Our party, in its broadest sense, should be the people party of Afghanistan. It is essential to take steps for the designation of such a name which should depict the real identity of the Party today & tomorrow... The change in the name of the Party will not be merely a technical one but it will include bringing changes in the program & some amendments in the PDPA Constitution...

The extensive alliance of forces is the guarantor of the full domination over the situation. However, the diverse political forces of the country do not consider the National Front of the ROA, in its present identity, as a political front. Thus, an immediate dialogue should be made, not only with political allies but with all sound national forces, in order to come to a united view for a broad political alliance of all forces advocating peace & reconstruction.



President Najibullah

In consideration of the following objectives, the concentration of forces in two centers, the National Front & in the Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Left, is not desirable. Because all parties & organizations have chosen a progressive course, a desirable alliance will be a broad, powerful & integrated alliance of the supporters of peace, not limited alliances. On the other hand, the persistent dependence on a leftist alliance entails the danger of its isolation from the total of the movement of peace-lovers in which the participation of all moderate forces is necessary.

Collective efforts should be made in order that a broad front of advocates of peace & reconstruction, in an organizational & work plan framework admissible to all, be created as a united center for the concentration of forces. This in no way will negate the bilateral & multilateral relationships existing among the elements composing the front.

The National Front should be formed from political forces, & the gov't, which will be set today or tomorrow, should come from the Front. This way, the Front is encompassing all political forces. This is in conformity with the program of action of the PDPA & the policy of Nat'l Reconciliation. Therefore, any political forces which want to participate in the gov't should enter the subsequent coalition through the Front.

The requirements for the compilation & approval of PDPA action plans are quite different from present demands at both the nat'l & int'l levels. The November plenum of the PDPA CC considered that thought should be given to introduce some amendments to the action plan which would entail the conditions of coalition, promotion of the Party role as an accelerating factor for peace, & the consolidation of nat'l unity in which the public benefits & nat'l interests of Afghans must be taken into account... The Party should gradually rule out the gap between the public & Party interests.

The PDPA, the biggest political & social organization, made the initiative of relinquishing the monopoly of power & is going to keep it on. As the executor & organizer of the Nat'l Reconciliation, one of the most important Party tasks is the absorption of other political forces inside & outside the country, influential tribesmen, patriotic intellectuals, clergymen & all stratas of society into the broad-based coalition administration. The recent events in Eastern Europe once more rang the bell of danger & demonstrated that socio-political conditions cannot be reformed with past formulas... Pursuing the policy of Nat'l Reconciliation released the PDPA from political isolation; political pluralism has emerged in the country.

غر غر همان غرست  
لاکن پالایش نو شده

It's the same donkey, but  
with a new saddle.



#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB - Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin  
AIG - Afghan Interim Government  
BNA - Bakhtar News Agency  
CC - Central Committee  
CSM - Christian Science Monitor  
DYO A - Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan  
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany  
GDR - German Democratic Republic  
ICRC - Int'l Committee of the Red Cross  
KT - Kabul Times  
LAT - Los Angeles Times  
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization  
NWFP - Northwest Frontier Province  
NYT - New York Times  
OIC - Organization of Islamic Conference  
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan  
PSFO - Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization  
PT - Pakistan Times  
PVO - Private Voluntary Organization  
RC - Revolutionary Council  
ROA - Republic of Afghanistan  
SCMP - South China Morning Post  
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly  
UNGOMAP- United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghani-  
stan & Pakistan  
UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
WSJ - Wall Street Journal



Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the  
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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# CHRONOLOGY

12/6 - SCMP - The ROA claims it has foiled an assassination & sabotage plot by Hekmatyar's group. Over 100 Hezbi-Islami rebels were arrested & will be tried by a special court (see 1/3).

12/11 - SCMP - MIDIA, a mujahidin information service, reported guerrilla successes in northern Afghanistan:

Mr Abdul Rahim, MIDIA director, said at least 40 communist troops were either killed or captured in the fighting, including Brigadier-General Alam, commander of the 53rd government regiment based in Faryab.


Mr Rahim said the heavy fighting in northern Afghanistan belies the Marxist President, General Najibullah's claims that rebel field commanders have struck deals with the ruling communists. He also said it debunks General Najibullah's assertion

that fighting is restricted to border areas because of the direct involvement of Pakistan's military, a charge denied by Pakistan.

Mr Rahim said: "Najibullah is claiming that fighting is just going on in the south and along the border, around Jalalabad, because of interference from Pakistan."

"But the fighting in the north proves that it's not true and that the Mujahideen have not reached any agreement with the Government."

12/19 - PT - Tribal chiefs from the Khyber & North Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand & Orakzai Agencies met in Peshawar & said they were determined to resist every move to bring Zahir Shah back to Afghanistan. (A recently held jirgah in North Waziristan apparently supported Zahir Shah.)



12/20 PT - Soviet authorities hinted that Kabul would soon release 32 prisoners, including 24 Pakistanis, 3 Saudis, 1 Palestinian & 4 Afghans.

12/21 - PT - "Reliable sources believe that the visiting US Congressman, Stephen Solarz, has made it clear to Foreign Min.

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan that American aid for the Afghan resistance will not continue beyond 1990."



12/22 - PT - Speaking in Islamabad, Soviet academician Yuri Gankovsky said that the USSR never tried to damage Pakistan; indeed, in 1971, after the breakup of Pakistan, it was the USSR which prevented the Afghan army from invading Peshawar. He said that the then Afghan army commander, Abdul Wali Khan, had told Zahir Shah that the time was right to occupy Peshawar. The ex-King consulted the Soviets & was told by the then prime minister not to initiate any such move.

12/28 - LAT - Afghan rebels marked the 10th anniversary of the Soviet invasion by rocketing Kabul & holding rallies in Peshawar (see p. 13).

- Hong Kong Standard - The Kabul leadership said it would fight on. According to Sultan Ali Keshmmand:

"We don't agree with the expression 'Soviet invasion of Afghanistan'. They came at the request of Afghanistan and as far as we are concerned, Soviet officers and soldiers rendered enormous and useful services to us," Premier Sultan Ali Keshmmand said.

"Experience has shown that the Soviets did not come to Afghanistan to occupy and if the Soviet citizens now consider that the troop entry into Afghanistan was a mistake, it is their decision," Mr Keshmmand said in an interview on the eve of the intervention anniversary.


Party theoretician Mr Najmuddin Kawyani was more cautious: "We made a lot of mistakes," the Central Committee member told journalists. "Whether the Soviet troop intervention was a mistake, history will tell."

The Afghan communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), had not tackled the subject, he said, adding: "Right now the priority is defence of the homeland."

"They promised us food, clothing and housing," a ditty goes. "They gave us death, shrouds and coffins."

12/29 - HK Standard - On the invasion anniversary, Soviet soldiers killed or captured in Afghanistan were remembered in ceremonies held throughout the Soviet Union.

12/30 PT - ROA Politburo member Najm-uddin Kawayani said he had the impression that Washington & Moscow might be close to agreement on a mutual arms reduction in Afghanistan. "We are mentally prepared for a mutual reduction," he said. A Soviet commented that Moscow's position was "not one of supporting a particular regime but of supporting a state."



1/1 - PT - Najibullah suggested reshaping the PDPA in line with reforms taking place in Eastern Europe. He said future PDPA actions should be allowed to reflect the people's desire for peace & proposed that a "national front of left-wing parties" be set up to take over the future Afghan gov't.

- AFGHANews (Jamiat) - UN Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar proposed that a 10-member delegation from the interim gov't, the Iran-based mujahideen, the pro-Zahir Shah people & commanders from inside be formed to talk with him about ways to bring peace to Afghanistan.

- Jamiat-i-Islami reported a "few" Hizb-i-Islami commanders, including Syed Jamal Agha, were hung in the presence of 43 leading elders in northern Afghanistan. Agha reportedly confessed his role in the murder of ca. 30 Jamiat commanders in an ambush last summer (see FORUM XVII, #5, p. 9).

■ Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami guerilla group shows a copy of newspaper which carries Jamiat chief Burhanuddin Rabbani's interview about the hanging of four Hezb members in Taloqan, Afghanistan.

(HK Std 1/3)

1/2 - BNA - The "Commission of Anti-Emergency Incidents" of the ROA Council of Ministers "distributed over Afs 770,000 on 25 families damaged as a result of rocket attacks of extremists on Kabul City." - There are 5,019 Party committees in the PDPA; Party membership is over 200,000 of which 9.4% are women, according to Payam, the Party paper.

- UN Press Release HR/CN/97 - Felix Ermacora, the UN Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur, will visit Pakistan & Afghanistan from 1/6-14. The Commission will meet from 1/29 - 3/9.

1/3 - SCMP - Gulbuddin denied any Hezb-i-Islami involvement in a recent coup plot in Kabul (see 12/6 & p. 14). And in Kabul, ROA sources said that 127 people, including 11 generals, were arrested in last month's coup attempt. The ROA air defense chief was among those arrested. - The ROA complained to the UN about "rocket attacks by Pakistan" against Afghan cities. It asked the UN to intervene to end the attacks.

1/4 - BNA - An Afghan-Greece Friendship Assn was inaugurated in Kabul.

- A volume, "Reconstruction & New Political Thinking" was published in Kabul. 239 pp. - Abdul Ahab Wolosi was appointed ROA Ambassador to the GDR.

- Local opposition commanders in north-eastern Afghanistan have asked int'l aid sources to render assistance to ease food shortages in the area. Najibullah issued a decree stating that the ROA would provide the necessary goods (see p. 12 ).

1/5 - BNA - An Hazara tribal unit was established within the ROA Ministry of State Security on the occasion of the Ministry's 10th anniversary. Col. Gen. Ghulam Farouq Yaqubi heads the Ministry.





1/6 - BNA - Work is progressing on finding a new name for the PDPA.

1/8 - BNA - Najibullah presided over a consultative session of the leaders of the political parties & organizations. The group decided to create a nat'l commission consisting of representatives from "all political-social parties & organizations, scholars, clergies, individual political figures & intellectuals."

- PT - Gulbuddin said that mujahideen leaders were close to a consensus over holding elections in Afghanistan but he ruled out the formation of a shura which, he said, would meet the same fate as those held by Najib, Taraki, etc. He said he would join the interim gov't as soon as the election process started.

1/10 - BNA - The National Front, headed by Abdul Rahim Hatif, is reorganizing & will become a political organization.

It was not one before because it was a coalition front between the PDPA & individuals & "individuals cannot be considered as political parties," Hatif said. Hatif quoted Najibullah as saying that anyone or any force intending to take part in the gov't should join it through the Nat'l Front, although the Front will not have a monopoly on parliamentary councils.

- PT - A former editor of the Kabul Times, Prof. Habibur Rehman Hulla, (sic) defected to the mujahideen.

- NYT - France will send its diplomats back to Kabul in spite of US objections. Bush Administration officials feel the move will make it harder for US State Sec'y Baker to argue that the Kabul Gov't must be replaced by a broad-based gov't:

French officials defended the decision today, saying that Kabul is now more secure and that Paris needs a diplomatic presence in order to get first-hand information on the political and military situation in Afghanistan and to provide protection for French citizens in the country.

"This decision has no political meaning," Reuters quoted Ms. Avicé was quoted as saying. "In no way it means a change in our policy vis-a-vis the Afghan problem."



Abdul Rahim Hatif

1/10 - SCMP - Between October & December the Soviets shipped 30 missile launchers, 165 tanks, 240 armored vehicles, 470 trucks laden with supplies & 125 artillery pieces to Kabul, according to diplomats.

1/11 - BNA - Shooting started on a new Afghan feature film, "The Plunderers," which is being made in collaboration with the ROA Interior Ministry.

1/12 - BNA - The UN Security Council extended the activities of UNGOMAP for another 2 months.

- Najibullah promoted 5 major gen'ls to the rank of lt. gen'l & 11 colonels to major gen'ls.

1/13 - BNA - The ROA Foreign Ministry invited all the countries which had evacuated their embassies during the Soviet troop withdrawal to send their diplomats back and reactivate their embassies.

- The ROA Export Development Bank reported a revenue increase of 13% over last year.

1/14 - BNA - An adviser to the ROA Min. of Agriculture & Land Reforms said that 95% of the country's agricultural production comes from private farms. However, "a huge portion of state assistance goes to private sectors."

- Felix Ermacora met with Najibullah who stressed that "reports on the human rights situation in Afghanistan should be delivered to the int'l community objectively."

1/14 - NYT - Pres. Bush sent a delegation of US officials, led by Robert Kimmitt, the #3 man at the State Dept., to South Asia to assess US policy on Afghanistan (see p. 16).

- UN Sec'y Gen'l Perez de Cuellar will take his Afghan plan to Moscow (see p. 16).

1/15 - BNA - On the Kimmitt delegation: "The VOA says that Kent (sic) will meet with the herds of the extremist groups in Peshawar."

- Since 1987, over 131,301 refugees from Pakistan, 97,384 from Iran & 2,695 from other countries have returned to the ROA.

- AFGHANews - Reports from Kabul give the free market exchange rate as Afs 525/US \$; the official rate as Afs 125/US \$. In the 1st 6 months of 1989, the ROA imported \$373m worth of goods but exported only \$104.9m worth (see p. 12).

1/15 - The Muslim - The Peshawar offices of the Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA) were robbed (see p. 14). [A reliable source told the FORUM that in addition to the items listed in the article, a car & 2 Kalashnikovs were also stolen.]



Shahinawaz Tanai

1/16 - BNA - The petroleum supply dept. delivers 24,000 liters of diesel fuel & kerosene to Kabul residents daily. 50 - 100 oil tankers come into Kabul from Hairatan via the Salang Highway every day. (see 1/18).

1/17 - BNA - Since March, the ROA GNP has reached Afs 1971b, according to Sultan Ali Keshtmand. \$164.7m was earned through exports of carpets, leather goods - including karakul pelts, fruits, medicinal herbs & cumin. However, in electricity production & distribution, chemical & light industries, medicine production & construction materials, "backwardness has been noticed." The transport system has problems, too, because of extremists. - The 7th group of crippled Afghan children left for Bonn for medical treatment. The 17 children were selected by the Afghan Red Crescent & the FRG Peace Village.

- SCMP - Najibullah appealed to all sides of the Afghan conflict to join a "grand council" to try to end the war.

1/18 - BNA cites Payam, the PDPA daily: "Despite the abundance of petroleum in the pump stations" in Kabul, the "requirements of the people are not met & half of the people who apply in the early mornings to get diesel & kerosene leave the stations empty handed in the evenings. The daily believes that increment in the supply of petroleum to the said stations will tackle problems of the Kabul citizens in these cold days." [Payam seems to be the voice of Party criticism these days as similar complaints appear frequently. Ed.]

1/20 - BNA - The AIG's shura plan has been rejected by Gulbuddin & the Iranian groups. Spokesmen for the Iranian alliance said: "Mujaddidi & Sayaf would not let women to candidate themselves or vote for someone."

1/20 - BNA - ROA Defense Min. Shahinawaz Tanai said it was "quite untrue that unity does not exist in the PDPA ranks... Lack of experience, political unmatuity, etc., have created some problems for us, but we have never neglected our duties

which is rendering services to the people in any moment."

- NYT - Barbara Crossette reports that the US delegation (see 1/14) completed its week-long tour convinced that the nations involved in the Afghan conflict are more amenable to a compromise.

A United States official said tonight that the American delegation was impressed by the Saudis' apparent willingness to play a larger role in the region. Saudi Arabia has been a substantial backer of the Afghan guerrillas, supplying not only arms but a range of support services and nonmilitary aid along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Its religious ties to the Islamic Afghan rebels are strong.

The delegation's visit precedes a planned trip to Moscow next month by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, and another this week by Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of the United Nations.

There are hopes in Washington that India, which has been a strong backer of the Soviet-installed Kabul Government, may be persuaded to relax its inflexible position and act as intermediary in Afghanistan, particularly if Moscow moves toward a political solution.

#### U.S. Ability Overestimated


The official implied that the United States, the Soviet Union and Pakistan have all more or less abandoned the backing of individual candidates for leadership in Kabul.

The official added that many people had in any case overestimated the ability of the United States to pick and choose among guerrilla groups.

On the other side, Moscow was also apparently prepared to withdraw support for the Afghan President, Maj. Gen. Najibullah, if he were to stand in the way of the establishment of a non-aligned Government that did not threaten Soviet interests and allowed the Soviet Union to cut back its costs in Kabul.


Moscow is reported to be spending about \$300 million a month, or up to \$3.7 billion a year, on military and other aid to the Najibullah Government. Although the United States does not disclose the cost of its support for the Afghan guerrillas, the total annual figure is thought to be about \$600 million.

Diplomats in the region believe that the Soviet Union cannot afford to spend sums like these indefinitely if it intends to revamp its economy.



1/22 - BNA - A high-ranking delegation from the Supreme Soviet Presidium arrived in Kabul at the invitation of the ROA Nat'l Assembly.

1/25 - SCMP:



Najibullah

KABUL: The Afghan President, General Najibullah, yesterday rejected comparisons of his Soviet-backed government to toppling East Bloc regimes, and said he saw no reason to step down. The former chief of the feared Afghan secret service, Khad, which has previously been blamed for thousands of killings and torture, said demands that he resign were "pretexts" by the resistance to keep away from negotiations.

- BNA - The ROA Council of Ministers approved Najibullah's decree to send humanitarian assistance to the people in the Hazarajat who, because of heavy snowfall and "lack of agricultural output," are facing an acute food shortage.

- Italy will reopen its embassy in Kabul. VOA reported that Japan & West Germany will follow suit.

- Najibullah told a press conference that there are 8 political parties in Afghanistan besides the PPPA & that a number of them "freely publish their own papers." Replying to a question on holding elections: "We are seriously abiding by & committed to whatever we have proposed...The ROA will concede the outcomes of the elections, whatever it might be, & will not resort to use of force to change them. Naturally, such a commitment could not be unilateral. This matter requires similar official statements & commitments on the part of the opposition as well. In principle, we do not oppose the creation of a unified armed force." Its formation "could only be predicted at the last stage of the foundation of a broad-based gov't. Til then each side will preserve its own armed force & areas under its control by observing the condition of a hiatus in armed operation." ...

"The events which resulted in the situation in & around Afghanistan have a complex character. The dispatch & withdrawal of troops to & from Afghanistan

have become now a part of history... I confirm the recent assessment made by the present Soviet leadership in regard to the sending of troops to Afghanistan."

1/26 - PT - Ca. 5,000 Afghan refugees staged a demonstration in front of the AIG headquarters in Peshawar, rejecting the shura formula & demanding the right to vote. The demonstration was "unofficially" sponsored by Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami.

1/28 - BNA - Since the April Revolution, 2<sup>1/2</sup>m Afghans have graduated from ROA literacy courses.

- The ROA & the USSR signed 7 documents on economic & technical cooperation, including an agreement for the USSR to give the ROA gratis aid valued at rubles 120m for 1990.

- The DYOA elected M. Ibrahim as its new 1st sec'y. He succeeds Farid Ahmad Mazdak who will remain an honorary DYOA member.

1/29 - BNA - The Salang Highway was closed for 24 hours because of heavy snows.

- The Afghan Film Inst. has produced 14 feature films since last March. Titles include "Striving," "Grandfather," "Epic," "Struggle," "Love," "Accident," "Wish" & "Footsteps."

1/30 - BNA - This year 226 students have graduated from the Kabul Curative Medicine Faculty. The foundation stone for a mass immunity clinic was laid in Kabul. The clinic, funded by UNICEF, will cost Afs 8m & be completed in 3 months.

1/31 - PT - Mujaddidi told a Nooristani tribal delegation that while he favored local councils, he was opposed to any attempts to divide Afghanistan on ethnic lines. "I am against the separation & division of my country under different names."



په زور کول نه کېږي  
Community is not created by force.

2/1 - LAT - A car bomb exploded in Kabul in front of the Bakhtar Information Agency, killing 6 people & injuring 122.

- AFGHANews - Sayyaf, Rabbani, Nabi & Khalis left for Saudi Arabia last week to meet Saudi officials & discuss the Afghan situation.

- The AIG will hold elections throughout Afghanistan for a broad-based shura. The elections will start this month (see p 18).

- NYT - The US aid program which provides food & health care for Afghans will be increased from \$22m (last year) to \$34.9m this year.

- BNA - A group of 22 "economic saboteurs," including heads & employees of coupon outlets & the food procurement dept. were convicted recently in Kabul. Those receiving sentences of over 15 years can appeal.

2/5 - BNA - Sultan Ali Keshmand told a group of visiting journalists that "the growth rate of inflation [in the ROA] was 10% last year." The "national net income of the country reached Afs 510m" last year. "Export of gas from Afghanistan to the USSR will be resumed soon."



**Sultan Ali Keshmand**

- Regarding the upcoming Baker-Shevardnadze talks, Najibullah told the same journalists that to stop the war in Afghanistan, "stopping of supplying arms is a matter of prime importance." Existing arms stockpiles should be "evacuated from Afghanistan" under the supervision of the UN.

- A radio-TV station opened in the Shindand District of Herat. There will be TV programs 4 hours/day.

- NYT - US proposals in Moscow:

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d is expected to propose to the Soviets this week an approach for ending the Afghan conflict that would allow President Najibullah to remain in power in Kabul for a transitional period before having to step down, Administration officials said today.

Mr. Baker will continue to insist unequivocally that the Soviets guarantee Mr. Najibullah's eventual departure, officials said, but he is expected to propose that this departure be arranged through a gradual transfer of power in which the Afghan leader would remain in office in the early stages and then be phased out by the final stage.

2/7 - PT - The UNHCR will give Pakistan Rs 452,649,000 during 1990 for the support of some 3.3m Afghan refugees. Total UNHCR refugee assistance in Pakistan this year will be \$52,392,000; some of the money goes to NGOs, some to World Bank projects & some to employment projects.

2/9 - NYT - The Soviet reaction to the US proposal on Afghanistan (see 2/5):

Asked for the Soviet reaction to the proposal, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennadi I. Gerasimov, said: "The American side showed us its plan, but it did not take into account the situation in Kabul, the difficulties of the Najibullah Government. But as a whole there was agreement on both sides that it is necessary to look for new approaches. It can be said that the realistic approach is a dialogue of national reconciliation, with the participation of all Afghan sides in the dialogue."

- US legislators sent Baker a letter (see p. 26 ).

2/10 - BNA - Najibullah's decree #1367 (on 2/5) ordered the state to render necessary assistance to the residents of Farah & Nimroz Provinces.

2/12 - BNA - Abdul Rahim Hatif (see 1/10) resigned the presidency of the Nat'l Front. [He remains a vice president of the ROA.] Farid Ahmad Muzdak was elected caretaker of the organization which is undergoing a restructuring.

- A committee chaired by Dr. Noor Ahmad Bariets will be formed to monitor medical services, regulate prices & control the smuggling of medicine & medical equipment.

2/13 - PT - The US & the USSR still have basic differences on Afghanistan. Both sides will continue to talk but "on the level of experts & not on the level of leaders." This will probably make the process take longer.

- BNA - Col. Gen. Moh'd Afzal Loudin was named chief administrator of Nangarhar & Laghman Provinces as well as commander of the eastern front.

2/14 - BNA - Najibullah announced proposals to end the war: "...the Afghan Republic proposes a ceasefire or a pause in the war operations to be bilaterally declared & observed... The ceasefire...could be announced partially in some areas.

"The ROA is prepared to stop Scud long-range rocket launches...in exchange of a stop of rocket barrages on Kabul & other cities of the country." (See also 1/25.)

2/15 - UN Press Release DH/583 - Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar said that "the time was long overdue for the Afghan nation to look to the future & for its leaders to put the interest of the nation above all others & lead the people out of their suffering." He appealed to the int'l community not to forget the Afghan people & "to provide generously" the financial & material resources necessary for a speedy repatriation of the refugees & the economic & social reconstruction of the country.

- BNA - India will give the ROA rupees 10m worth of medicines.

2/16 - NYT - The US has suspended a \$30m food aid program to the Afghan guerrillas because of "unique problems" in keeping track of where the aid went. A Congressional aide confirmed a Washington Post report that deliveries of wheat to the rebels were suspended after 2,400 tons were diverted by members of Pakistan's military intelligence agency, apparently for private gain. A State Dept. spokesman said the aid shipments would be resumed soon. - ROA Foreign Min. Abdul Wakil, visiting India, again said that Pakistan had plans to take over his country in the guise of an Islamic confederation ruled from Islamabad.

2/17 - BNA - At a press conference, Najibullah said the ROA was supporting the idea of setting up an "extensive council inside Afghanistan with the participation of all political forces inside & outside the country... The state of the ROA not only agrees with the formation of the council but guarantees the security of the participants... We have proposed that such a shura council can be convened in Kabul, Nangarhar or Kunar Province."

2/19 - NYT - Meanwhile, in Azerbaijan:

A central figure in any scenario is Mr. Polyanchko, the No. 2 party official in Azerbaijan. The second secretary in a Soviet republic is almost always Moscow's most-trusted agent, usually an ethnic Russian.

Before being sent to Baku, Mr.

Polyanchko was the Communist Party's chief political operative in Afghanistan, serving, according to a Soviet journalist who knew him, as "in effect, the real President of Afghanistan." Azerbaijani officials said Mr. Polyanchko was out of Baku and unavailable for an interview.

2/20 - BNA - Bank-i-Milli Afghanistan, established in 1933, has 7 branches in Kabul, 10 in the provinces plus offices in London, New York, Hamburg, Karachi, Peshawar & Chaman. "The interest rate of Bank-i-Milli in the year 1988 has gone up by 30% as compared to 1987."

- The Council of Ministers discussed the preservation & rehabilitation of Kabul's Bagh-i-Bala Park.


- ROA Dep. Prime Min. Moh'd Hakim visited the flooded areas of Farah Province yesterday & distributed "cash & kind assistance" to flood victims.

2/21 - BNA - The Law on Int'l Treaties of the ROA & Decree #1182 (issued in Nov., 1989) extending the state of emergency were published in the Official Gazette.

2/24 - NYT - Pakistan will not oppose the US plan on Afghanistan, according to Iqbal Akhund, Prime Min. Bhutto's Nat'l Security Adviser. However Akhund said he didn't think the idea would work, partly because the mujahideen still insist that Najibullah be removed as a condition for a negotiated settlement.

"The idea that Najibullah will be there in the beginning of the process and then disappear is theoretical and may not get off the ground," Mr. Akhund said in an interview on Thursday evening.

"The feeling I got in Moscow is that Najibullah is doing quite well, and why should he be pushed out?" he said. "It's not costing the Soviets a lot to supply the regime. They're flying in a lot of stuff that would otherwise go to the garbage heap."



- BNA - The draft of the new Nat'l Front platform was published last Tuesday. Public comment & suggestions are asked for before the platform is ratified.

3/2 - NYT - Opium production declined in 1989 from 700-800 metric tons in 1988 to 585 in 1989. However:

In Afghanistan, opium production has increased significantly over the last decade, much of it in areas controlled by United States-backed Afghan

Cont. on p. 12

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#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB	- Afghan Information Centre <u>Monthly Bulletin</u>
AIG	- Afghan Interim Government
BNA	- Bakhtar News Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSFO	- Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
ROA	- Republic of Afghanistan
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNGOMAP-	United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghani- stan & Pakistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the  
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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